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The Analytics of the Greek Crisis 
Celebratory Centenary Issue 
 
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas*, Thomas Philippon#, and Dimitri Vayanosⱡ 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We provide an empirical and theoretical analysis of the Greek Crisis of 2010. We first 
benchmark the crisis against all episodes of sudden stops, sovereign debt crises, and 
lending boom/busts in emerging and advanced economies since 1980. The decline in 
Greece’s output, especially investment, is deeper and more persistent than in almost 
any crisis on record over that period. We then propose a stylized macro-finance 
model to understand what happened. We find that a severe macroeconomic 
adjustment was inevitable given the size of the fiscal imbalance; yet a sizable share of 
the crisis was also the consequence of the sudden stop that started in late 2009. Our 
model suggests that the size of the initial macro/financial imbalances can account for 
much of the depth of the crisis. When we simulate an emerging market sudden stop 
with initial debt levels (government, private, and external) of an advanced economy, 
we obtain a Greek crisis. Finally, in recent years, the lack of recovery appears driven 
by elevated levels of non-performing loans and strong price rigidities in product 
markets. 
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3 
The Analytics of the Greek Crisis 
 
1. Introduction and motivation 
The economic crisis that Greece has been experiencing from 2008 onwards has been 
particularly severe. Real GDP per capita stood at approximately 22,600 Euros in 2008, 
and dropped to 17,000 Euros by 2014, a decline of 24.8%.1 The unemployment rate 
was 7.8% in 2008, and rose to 26.6% in 2014. The entire Greek banking system 
became insolvent during the crisis, and a large-scale recapitalization took place in 
2013. In 2012, Greece became the first OECD member country to default on its 
sovereign debt, and that default was the largest in world history. Greece received 
financial assistance from other Eurozone (EZ) countries and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the size of this bailout package was also the largest in 
history. 
The implications of the Greek crisis extended well beyond Greece. The bailout 
package that Greece received was large partly because of fears of contagion to other 
countries in the EZ and to their banking systems. Moreover, at various stages during 
the crisis, the continued membership of Greece in the EZ was put in doubt. This 
tested the strength and the limits of the currency union, and of the European project 
more generally. 
This paper provides an ‘interim’ report on the Greek crisis (‘interim’ in the sense that 
the crisis is still unfolding). We proceed in three steps. First, we describe the main 
macroeconomic dynamics that Greece experienced before and during the crisis. 
Second, we put these dynamics in perspective by benchmarking the Greek crisis 
against all episodes of sudden stops, sovereign debt crises, and lending boom/busts 
in emerging and advanced economies since 1980. Third, we develop a DSGE model 
designed to capture many of the relevant features of the Greek crisis and help us 
identify its main drivers. 
The global financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States hit Greece through 
three interlinked shocks. The first shock was a sovereign debt crisis: investors began 
to perceive the debt of the Greek government as unsustainable, and were no longer 
willing to finance the government deficit. The second shock was a banking crisis: 
Greek banks had diﬃculty financing themselves in the interbank market, and their 
                                                          
1
 GDP per capita comes from Eurostat and is expressed in 2010 Euros. 
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solvency was put in doubt because of projected losses to the value of their assets. 
The third shock was a sudden stop: foreign investors were no longer willing to lend to 
Greece as a whole (government, banks, and firms), and so the country could not 
finance its current account deficit. 
To many observers, that last shock was a startling development. After all, the very 
existence of a common currency, and therefore of an automatic provision of liquidity 
against good collateral through its common central bank, was supposed to insulate 
member countries against a sudden reversal of private capital of the kind experienced 
routinely by Emerging Market economies (EM). Just like a sudden stop on California 
or Texas could not happen since Federal Reserve funding would substitute instantly 
and automatically for private capital, the common view was a sudden stop could not 
happen to Greece or Portugal since European Central Bank (ECB) funding would 
substitute instantly and automatically for private capital.2 The belief that sudden 
stops were a thing of the past may have in turn contributed to the emergence of 
mounting internal and external imbalances, in Greece and elsewhere in the EZ  
(Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002)). Yet, at the onset of the crisis, Greece and other EZ 
members did experience a classic sudden stop. The built-in defence mechanisms of 
the EZ were activated and the ECB provided much needed funding to the Greek 
economy. How much, then, did this sudden stop contribute to the subsequent 
meltdown and through what channels? And what was the contribution of other 
factors? These are among the questions that we seek to address in this paper. 
The first main result that emerges from our macro-benchmarking exercise is that 
Greece’s drop in output (a 25% decline in real GDP per capita between 2008 and 
2013) was significantly more severe and protracted than during the average crisis. 
This applies to the sample of countries that experienced sudden stops; to the sample 
that experienced sovereign defaults; to the sample that experienced lending booms 
and busts; and even to the sample that experienced all three shocks combined (we 
call these episodes “Trifectas”). The collapse in investment (75% decline between 
2008 and 2013) was even more severe. Importantly, we find that the diﬀerence in 
output dynamics is not driven by the exchange-rate regime. Countries whose 
currency remains pegged experience a larger output drop on average than countries 
with floating rates. But unlike these countries, whose output rebounds after a few 
years, Greece’s output continued to drop, to a significantly lower level. 
                                                          
2
 Ingram (1973) was among the first to articulate the view that sudden stops could not happen in a currency union, with 
the corollary that there was no need to monitor external imbalances. Against this view, Garber (1999) argued that the 
European payment system (Target) at the core of the European Monetary Union could itself propagate a speculative 
attack. 
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One possible explanation for the severity of Greece’s crisis is the high level of debt—
government, private, and external—at the onset of the crisis. Greece’s government 
debt stood at 103.1% of output in 2007, its net foreign assets at -99.9% of output, 
and its private-sector debt at 92.4% of output. On the former two measures, Greece 
fared worse than Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, the four other major EZ countries 
hit by the crisis. Greece fared worse than those countries also on its government 
deficit and current-account deficit, which stood at 6.5% and 15.9% of output, 
respectively, in 2007. And debt levels in Greece were more than twice as larger than 
in the average of the emerging-market economies which account for most of the 
crisis episodes in our sample. 
To identify the role of debt, as well as of other factors such as the sudden stop of 
private capital, in driving the severity of the Greek crisis, we turn to our DSGE model. 
The model is designed to capture in a simple and stylized manner the three types of 
shocks that hit Greece. It also captures a rich set of interdependencies between the 
shocks. The model features a government, two types of consumers, firms, and banks. 
The government can borrow, raise taxes, spend, and possibly default on its debt. 
Consumers diﬀer in their subjective discount rate. Impatient consumers are those 
who borrow in equilibrium, subject to a debt limit. Firms can borrow and invest, and 
face sticky wages and prices. Consumers and firms can borrow from banks and can 
default on their debts. The rates at which the government, consumers, and firms can 
borrow depend on the probability with which these entities can default and on the 
losses given default. In turn, the expected costs of default (probability times losses) 
depend on the ratio of debt to income. 
In the model, a sovereign risk shock increases the government’s funding costs. The 
government responds by increasing taxes and reducing expenditures, which exerts a 
contractionary eﬀect on the economy. In turn, the decline in output increases the 
expected costs of default on private-sector loans, causing funding costs for 
consumers and firms to rise and investment to drop. Conversely, a sudden stop 
increases directly the rate at which consumers and firms can borrow, causing 
investment, consumption and output to decline. The decline in fiscal revenues pushes 
up sovereign yields and has an adverse impact on public debt dynamics. Hence, in our 
model, sovereign risks and private sector risks are intertwined and shocks to one 
sector of the economy can aﬀect funding costs and default rates throughout all 
sectors. 
We estimate the model using Bayesian methods and annual data on government 
revenue and spending, household debt, non-performing loans in the private sector, 
borrowing rates for the government and the corporate sector, as well as price and 
wage inflation. The model features eight stochastic shocks in each year, identical to 
the number of variables that we use in the estimation. We find that the model does 
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an excellent job of matching additional variables such as output, investment, and the 
trade balance (which the model was not asked to replicate). We then perform two 
tasks with the model. First, we decompose the movements in output, investment, 
and other key variables into the contribution of each type of shock. This helps us 
determine which shocks were the most important in driving the crisis dynamics. 
Second, we use the model to perform a number of “counterfactuals” to identify the 
role played by diﬀerent aspects of the institutional environment. We examine, in 
particular, how the dynamics of output and investment would have been diﬀerent if 
debt levels in Greece were set at the average of emerging-market economies; if 
banks’ funding costs had not increased during the crisis, as a possible eﬀect of a 
European banking union; if the Greek government had followed a more virtuous fiscal 
path in the years preceding the crisis; and if prices and wages had been more flexible. 
As in Agatha Christie’s ‘Murder on the Orient Express’, our model indicates that many 
forces contributed to the ‘murder’ of the Greek economy. Yet a few factors stand out. 
First and most importantly, given the size of the fiscal imbalances, a substantial fiscal 
correction was inevitable. According to our estimates, fiscal consolidation accounted 
for approximately 50% of the output drop from peak to trough. Much of the 
remainder is explained by the increase in funding costs for the private sector 
(“sudden stop” in our model) and the sovereign (“sovereign risk shock”). The 
combination of the two shocks accounted for an additional 40% of the output drop 
from peak to trough, with the sudden stop driving more than half of the eﬀect. 
Lastly, our estimates indicate that mark-up shocks in product markets and a surge in 
non-performing loans contributed significantly to the lack of recovery in 2014 and 
2015: in the absence of these shocks, output in 2014-15 would have recovered 
approximately 35% of its peak-to-trough drop. These findings indicate that the 
external dimension of the crisis may slowly be fading, and that the forces holding 
back the Greek economy are now largely domestic and microeconomic: the recovery 
will entail cleaning up non-performing loans, and improving competition in goods and 
services markets so as to facilitate the adjustment in prices relative to wages. 
The eﬀects of the shocks described above were made larger by high leverage and low 
price flexibility. Our counterfactual exercises allow us to examine more directly the 
eﬀects of these factors. We find that if the levels of government, private, and external 
debt in Greece had been comparable to those in the average of the emerging-market 
economies (so smaller by about half), the peak-to-trough decline in output would 
have been smaller by about a third. And the same conclusion holds if the prices and 
wages had been twice as flexible. 
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2. The Greek  Economy Before and During the Crisis 
This section describes the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables in Greece before 
and during the crisis. We focus on the behaviour of output and investment, as well as 
on the accumulation of debt—government, private, and external. We also describe 
the three shocks through which the global financial crisis aﬀected Greece (sudden 
stop, sovereign debt crisis, and banking crisis) as well as their interrelationships. This 
sets the stage for the empirical exercise in Section 3, and motivates some of the 
modelling choices and analysis in Sections 4-6. 
2.1  Pre-crisis 
 
Output. Figure  1 plots GDP per capita in 2014 US dollars, adjusted for Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP), and in a log scale, from 1980 onwards. In this figure, as well as in 
subsequent figures and tables in this Section, we compare Greece to the four other 
major Eurozone (EZ) countries that were hit by the EZ crisis: Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), 
Spain (ES), and Portugal (PT). 
 
Figure 1:  GDP per capita for Greece and other EZ crisis countries, 1980-2014. The data come from The 
Conference Board Total Economy Database. GDP is expressed in 2014 US dollars, is adjusted for PPP using 
2011 weights, and is plotted in a log scale. 
As of 1980, Greek GDP per capita was above that of Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. 
During the 1980s Greece experienced relative stagnation, and was overtaken by 
Ireland and Spain. Greece grew faster during the period 1996-2000 and especially 
from 2001, when it entered the Eurozone (EZ), until 2008. By 2008, Greece had 
almost caught up with Spain. Motivated by Figure 1, we divide the period 1996-2014 
into three sub-periods: the period 1996-2000, during which Greece experienced a 
boom in anticipation of EZ entry; the period 2001-2008 during which the boom 
continued with Greece inside the EZ; and the crisis period 2009-2014. In the tables 
constructed in the rest of this section, we report averages of macroeconomic 
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variables for the three sub-periods. In some of the tables we also compare with the 
year 1995, which we take as indicative of the Greek economy before the (actual or 
anticipated) eﬀects of EZ entry.3  
       Total Investment      
     95 96-00     01-08 09-14     
    ES 22.0 23.7 28.8 21.0     
    GR 20.4 23.1 23.7 14.6     
    IE 18.2 22.3 26.1 16.2     
    IT 19.0 19.4 21.1 18.6     
    PT 23.3 26.5 23.9 17.4     
      
 Corporate Investment  Residential Investment  Public Investment 
 95 96-00 01-08 09-14  95    96-00      01-08 09-14 95     96-00     01-08 09-14 
ES 11.7 13.0 13.9 12.0  6.0 7.0 10.7 5.7 4.3 3.7 4.2 3.3 
GR 8.4 10.5 10.3 7.7  8.6 8.8  9.2 3.7 3.4 3.8 4.2 3.2 
IE 10.6 12.3 11.4 11.0  5.2 7.1 10.6 2.7 2.4 2.9 4.1 2.5 
IT 11.3 11.8 12.9 10.8  5.1 4.8 5.3 5.1 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.7 
PT 11.6 13.8 13.7 11.1  7.3 7.7 6.1 3.1 4.4 5.0 4.1 3.2 
 
Table 1: Investment in Greece and other EZ crisis countries, 1995-2014, as percentage of GDP. The data 
come from AMECO. Investment is measured by the series “Gross fixed capital formation: total economy,” 
and does not include inventories. Residential investment is measured by “Gross fixed capital formation: 
dwellings;” corporate investment by “Gross fixed capital formation: private sector” minus residential 
investment; and public investment by “Gross fixed capital formation: government.” 
Investment. Table 1 reports the level of investment in Greece during the periods 
1996-2000, 2001-2008, and 2009-2014, and compares with 1995. The table also 
decomposes investment into corporate, residential, and public, and compares with 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Greece experienced the second-largest increase in 
corporate investment from 1995 to 1996-2000, after Portugal. Corporate investment 
remained at that elevated level during 2001-2008. Thus, EZ entry and its anticipation 
were associated with a significant rise in corporate investment in Greece. That rise, 
however, occurred from a low base, and corporate investment remained significantly 
lower than in the other countries. 
Unlike Ireland and Spain, Greece did not experience a significant increase in 
residential investment from 1995 to 1996-2008. Residential investment was already 
high in 1995, however, and the real-estate boom in Ireland and Spain only meant that 
residential investment in those countries caught up with and exceeded somewhat 
that in Greece. 
Net Foreign Assets. The fast growth of Greek GDP per capita during the period 1996-
                                                          
3
 An average during the period 1980-1995 would have been more informative of the state of the Greek economy before 
EZ entry. We use only the year 1995 because data before 1995 are not available or precise enough. 
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2008 was associated with an increase in external indebtedness. Figure 2 plots net 
foreign assets (NFA) from 1980 onwards, as percentage of GDP. NFA for Greece were 
negative throughout that period. They were a relatively small fraction of GDP in 
absolute value until the mid-1990s, and they subsequently declined to a much more 
negative fraction. Table  2 reports the level of the current account in Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain during the periods 1996-2000, 2001-2008, and 2009-2014, 
and compares with 1995. The table decomposes the current account into (i) net 
exports and (ii) the sum of net current transfers and net primary income. 
Greece’s current account deteriorated from 1995 to 1996-2000, and deteriorated 
further during 2001-2008. The deterioration from 1996-2000 to 2001-2008 was 
particularly severe: 6.0% of GDP, larger than in the other countries. During 2001-
2008, Greece was running an average current account deficit of 11.7% of GDP, also 
larger than in the other countries. 
The deterioration of Greece’s current account from 1995 onwards was primarily 
driven by a decline in net current transfers and net primary income. Net current 
transfers to Greece declined partly because of the drop in EU subsidies, especially 
after the 2005 EU enlargement, as funds were re-directed to new entrants that were 
poorer than Greece. Net primary income declined also because workers’ remittances 
became smaller as Greece became a net immigration country, and because of 
growing interest payments on Greece’s rising external debt. Greece’s trade balance 
also deteriorated, through that period, reaching -10.6 percent of GDP during the 
period 2001-2008. 
 
Figure 2: Net foreign assets in Greece and other EZ crisis countries, 1980-2014, as percentage of GDP. The 
data come from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
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Current Account Surplus Net Exports 
   Net Current Transfers plus 
   Net Primary Incomes 
 95 96-00 01-08 09-14 95 96-00 01-08 09-14 95 96-00 01-08 09-14 
ES -1.2 -2.0 -6.7 -1.6 -1.0 -1.1 -4.1 0.8 -0.2 -0.9 -2.6 -2.4 
GR -2.8 -5.7 -11.7 -7.3 -8.3 -9.1 -10.6 -5.9 5.5 3.4 -1.1 -1.4 
IE 2.6 1.2 -2.3 1.7 10.9 12.0 12.4 19.2 -8.3 -10.8 -14.7 -17.5 
IT 2.0 1.5 -1.1 -1.0 3.7 2.8 0.1 0.4 -1.7 -1.3 -1.2 -1.4 
PT -3.4 -7.7 -9.8 -4.5 -6.4 -9.1 -8.5 -3.0 3.0 1.4 -1.3 -1.5 
 
Table 2: The current account in Greece and other EZ crisis countries 1995-2014, as percentage of GDP. The 
data come from AMECO. Net exports are measured by the series “Net exports of goods and services;" net 
current transfers by “Net current transfers from the rest of the world;" and net primary income by “Net 
primary income from the rest of the world." The current account surplus is the sum of the three series. 
The increase in Greece’s current account deficit from 1995 to 1996-2000 was 
associated with an increase in corporate investment and hence in productive 
capacity. Indeed, the current account deficit increased by 2.9% of GDP, corporate 
investment increased by 2.1%, and public investment by 0.4%. The increase in the 
current account deficit from 1996-2000 to 2001-2008, however, was associated with 
an increase in consumption. Indeed, the current account deficit increased by 6.0% of 
GDP, total savings declined by 6.7%, and corporate investment dropped slightly.  
The decline in total savings from 1996-2000 to 2001-2008 was primarily driven by 
private savings, which declined by 4.3% of GDP.4 
Government Debt. Figure 3 plots government debt from 1980 onwards, as 
percentage of GDP. As of 1980, government debt in Greece was 21.4% of GDP, lower 
than in all other countries except for Spain. Debt rose sharply during the 1980s, and 
by 1993 it had reached 94.4% of GDP, a level larger than in all other countries except 
for Italy. A combination of fiscal tightening to meet the criteria for EZ entry, and 
sharply lower interest rates in anticipation of that entry, helped stabilize and even 
reduce slightly the ratio of debt to GDP—to 88.5% in 1999. Budget discipline became 
looser after EZ entry, and especially after 2007. As a consequence, debt to GDP 
increased—to 103.1% in 2007 and 126.8% in 2009—despite the fast growth in GDP 
during the period 2001-2008. 
                                                          
4
 The fact that in the years immediately preceding and following EZ entry poorer members of the union –like Greece– 
would run large current account deficits was not a surprise. Rather, it is precisely what theory suggests should happen 
when countries catch-up and converge, as argued by  Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) in an influential paper that 
examined the experience of Greece and Portugal. That paper, too, noted that Greece did not experience an investment 
boom following EZ entry and that the decline in savings was mostly driven by private savings. 
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Figure 3: Government debt in Greece and other EZ crisis countries, 1980-2014, as percentage of GDP. The 
data come from AMECO, series “General government consolidated gross debt”. 
While debt to GDP increased only mildly from 1999 to 2007, there was a sharp 
increase in the amount of the debt held by foreign entities, and a consequent 
decrease in the amount held domestically. That trend was due mainly to the decline 
in private savings. Figure 4 plots gross government external debt for Greece, and 
compares with the same series for Portugal and Spain, and with Greece’s NFA.5 
 
Figure 4: Gross government external debt for Greece, Portugal, and Spain, 1999-2013, as percentage of 
GDP. The data come from the ECB, series “Gross External Debt – Government.” The data are quarterly, and 
we report the average over each year. 
Gross government external debt for Greece essentially coincides with the negative of 
                                                          
5
 Figure 4 starts in 1999 rather than 1980 because data before 1999 are not available. Subsequent figures also start later 
than 1980 for the same reason. 
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NFA. By contrast, gross government external debt for Portugal and Spain is 
significantly lower than the negative of those countries’ NFA (which are not plotted 
but are similar to Greece’s from Figure 2). Figure 4 thus indicates that Greece’s 
current account deficit essentially financed government borrowing.6     
Figure 5 plots government deficit as percentage of GDP. The figure compares Greece 
to Italy, which was the most similar to Greece in terms of the size of its government 
debt until the crisis, and to the EU average. The figure shows that Greece’s public 
finances improved in the run-up to EZ entry, but worsened steadily post-entry.  
The pre-entry improvement was similar to that in Italy and the EU average. Unlike in 
Greece, however, the latter series remained relatively stable post-entry and until the 
crisis. 
 
Figure 5: Government deficit in Greece, Italy, and the EU average, 1985-2014, as percentage of GDP. The 
data come from the EC, series “Surplus (Net lending or net borrowing; general government)”. 
Banks and Credit. From the mid-1990s and until the crisis, Greece experienced a 
boom in private credit. An extensive program of financial liberalization that took 
place in the late 1980s and the 1990s paved the way for the credit boom. It was also 
fuelled by easier access to foreign capital following EZ entry (and the anticipation of 
it). Figure 6 plots bank loans to the non-financial private sector for Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, as percentage of GDP. 
Private-sector loans to GDP were significantly lower in Greece than in the other 
countries before EZ entry: they stood at 34.1% of GDP in 1998, compared to 60.8% in 
Italy, 74.6% in Spain, 80.31% in Portugal, and 82.8% in Ireland. Loans to GDP grew 
                                                          
6
 While Figure 4 plots gross rather than net government external debt, gross external assets of the Greek government 
were negligible, as shown by  Hyppolite (2016). 
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faster in Greece than in any other country, however, after EZ entry. As of 2008, they 
stood at 103.0%, a ratio smaller than Ireland’s, Portugal’s, and Spain’s, but larger than 
Italy’s. 
 
Figure 6: Bank loans to the private sector excluding financial firms in Greece and other EZ crisis countries, 
1998-2014, as percentage of GDP. The loans data come from the Bank of Greece (BoG) in the case of Greece 
and from the European Central Bank (ECB) in for the other countries. (The ECB series for Greece is almost 
identical to the BoG series, except for an increasing divergence during the period 2004-2009, which leads to a 
discontinuity between 2009 and 2010 in the ECB series. The divergence is likely due to a change in loan 
classification by the BoG, which has not been incorporated in the ECB database.) The loan data are monthly 
and are sampled in December of each year. 
 
Figure 7: Gross external debt of financial firms for Greece and other EZ crisis countries, 1999-2013, as 
percentage of GDP. The data come from the ECB, series “Gross External Debt – MFIs.” The data are quarterly 
and we report the average over each year. We exclude the series for Ireland, which rises up to 425% of GDP, 
so that the series for the other countries can be seen more clearly. 
To finance their increasing lending activity, Greek banks became more reliant on 
wholesale funding through the interbank market. Figure 7 plots gross external debt 
for Greek banks, and compares with Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Gross external debt of 
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banks consists mainly of interbank loans. Gross external debt of Greek banks 
increased from 12.3% of GDP in 1999 to 46.2% of GDP in 2008. As in the case of 
private-sector loans to GDP, the growth rate was higher than in the other countries, 
and the 2008 level was smaller than Portugal’s, and Spain’s, but larger than Italy’s.  
  
2.2  Crisis 
 
The Three Shocks. The global financial crisis that began in 2007 found Greece in a 
highly vulnerable position. As of 2007, Greece’s current account deficit had reached 
15.9% of GDP, NFA stood at -99.9%, government deficit at 6.5%, and government 
debt at 103.1%. On all four measures, Greece fared worse than Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain. Greece’s banking system was also vulnerable. While the ratio of 
private-sector loans to GDP in Greece was lower than in Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, 
the exposure of Greek banks to their sovereign was larger than in those countries. 
Greece was hit by three interdependent shocks during the crisis. The first shock was a 
sovereign debt crisis: investors began to perceive the debt of the Greek government 
as unsustainable, and were no longer willing to finance the government deficit. The 
second shock was a banking crisis: Greek banks had diﬃculty financing themselves, 
and their solvency was put in doubt because of projected losses to the value of their 
assets. The third shock was a sudden stop: foreign investors were no longer willing to 
lend to Greece as a whole (government, banks, and firms), and so the country could 
not finance its current account deficit. 
The three shocks were interlinked. The banking crisis made the government’s fiscal 
problems worse. This was because the government had to inject equity capital into 
the banks, and had to provide them with guarantees so that they could borrow in the 
interbank market. Moreover, because banks had to curtail their lending, the economy 
slowed down and the government’s tax revenues declined. These channels were at 
play starting from the Fall of 2008, when Greek banks faced significant diﬃculties 
financing themselves in the interbank market. The Greek government passed a law in 
December 2008 that provided support to the banks, in the form of guarantees and 
equity capital. 
Conversely, the sovereign crisis made the banks’ liquidity and solvency problems 
worse. This was because concerns about default risk by the Greek government 
reduced the value of the Greek banks’ government-bond portfolio, and this put the 
banks’ solvency in doubt. Moreover, the government had to engage in significant 
fiscal tightening, and the ensuing recession meant that firms and households had 
diﬃculty repaying their loans, adding to the banks’ solvency problems. Finally, the 
guarantees given by the government to Greek banks diminished in value. That applied 
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both to the guarantees intended to help the banks borrow in the interbank market, 
and to the government-supplied deposit insurance. Hence, banks had more 
diﬃculties financing themselves, and their liquidity problems worsened. These 
channels were at play starting from September 2009, when investors began to 
perceive the debt of the Greek government as unsustainable. 
Both the sovereign and the banking crises were closely linked to the sudden stop. 
Indeed, most of government debt was held by foreign investors: out of government 
debt equal to 103.1% of GDP in 2007, the debt held by foreign investors was 76.1% of 
GDP. Greek financial firms had also significant foreign debt: their gross external debt 
was 41.8% of GDP in 2007. Since the Greek government and Greek banks 
intermediated most of the flow of foreign capital to Greece, the withdrawal of foreign 
capital meant that both sectors’ access to funds was seriously impaired. 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain were hit by some or all of the same shocks. The 
shocks’ eﬀects were more severe in the case of Greece, however, given the country’s 
larger vulnerability. 7 
Assistance to the Sovereign, and Sovereign Default. In May 2010, Greece agreed to 
follow an adjustment program financed and monitored by European institutions and 
the IMF. Under the terms of the agreement, Greece received a loan so as to avoid a 
default on its private creditors and reduce its government deficit more smoothly. In 
exchange, it had to engage in significant fiscal tightening and implement a battery of 
structural reforms. The agreed loan amount was 110bn Euros, or 44% of Greece’s 
2010 GDP. Out of that amount, 80bn came from other EZ countries and the remaining 
30bn from the IMF. The first adjustment program was rolled over into a second, 
agreed in February 2012. A third program began in August 2015. 
In March 2012, Greece agreed a debt restructuring with its private creditors. Under 
the terms of this Private Sector Involvement (PSI), government debt with face value 
199.2bn Euros was replaced by debt with face value 92.1bn. Greece was the only EZ 
country to default on its creditors. 
Assistance to the Banks, Recapitalizations, and Capital Controls. In addition to the 
loans made to the Greek government under the adjustment programs, assistance was 
provided to Greece through ECB loans to its banking system. These loans were 
administered either directly from the ECB, with a low interest rate and stringent 
collateral requirements, or indirectly via the Bank of Greece (BoG) as emergency 
                                                          
7
 Ireland and Spain had significantly lower levels of public debt. Italy had much lower levels of net external debt. 
Portugal was in a position somewhat similar to Greece, although with smaller government debt and deficits. 
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liquidity assistance (ELA), with a higher interest rate and less stringent collateral 
requirements. ECB loans were necessary to address the liquidity problems of Greek 
banks. They rose from 48bn Euros in January 2010 to a maximum of 158bn Euros in 
February 2012, then dropped to a minimum of 45bn Euros in November 2014, and 
then rose again to a maximum of 122bn in September 2015. ECB loans were at their 
maxima around times when there was a high perceived risk of Greece exiting the EZ 
(Grexit). The risk of Grexit was high around the double election of May and June 
2012, and during the first half of 2015 after a new Greek government opposed to the 
adjustment programs had been elected in January 2015. 
Greek banks went through a series of recapitalizations. Losses on the banks’ 
government-bond portfolio reduced the capital of all banks and rendered most of the 
large ones insolvent. Some of the banks were resolved, and their deposits and some 
of the loans were transferred to the four largest banks. The latter were recapitalized. 
The resolution and recapitalization process was completed in July 2013, and involved 
38.9bn Euros of public funds, which were loaned to Greece. An additional 3.1bn Euros 
were raised by private investors. That first, large-scale recapitalization was followed 
by a second in April and May 2014, when the banks raised 8.3bn Euros, solely from 
private investors. A third recapitalization took place in the fourth quarter of 2015. The 
total amount that was raised then was 13.7bn Euros, of which 8bn Euros was raised 
from private sources via new investment and debt-equity conversions. The second 
and third recapitalizations were made necessary because of increased projected 
losses on banks’ loans to the private sector. 
Macroeconomic developments. We finally review the macroeconomic developments 
during the crisis period 2009-2014, following a roughly similar order as for the pre-
crisis period. Greek GDP per capita declined sharply during the crisis, as shown in 
Figure 1. The decline was 25.8% between 2008 and 2014. It was much sharper than in 
Ireland (6.1%), Italy (10.3%), Portugal (7.8%), and Spain (9.6%). 
The decline in GDP was accompanied by a large decline in investment. The latter 
decline can be seen in Table  1 by comparing the crisis period with the pre-crisis one. 
It can be seen more sharply by comparing investment in 2014 to that in 2008. 
Investment in 2014 was less than half of its 2008 value, having dropped by 12.2% of 
GDP. Both the relative and the absolute declines were larger than in Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain. The level of investment in 2014 was also significantly lower than 
in the other countries. 
During the crisis, Greece reduced and almost eliminated its current account deficit. 
That deficit stood at 2.2% of GDP in 2014, down from 16.5% in 2008. The adjustment 
occurred entirely through a drop in investment. Total savings did not change: 
government savings increased as a result of the fiscal tightening that took place 
during the crisis, but that eﬀect was oﬀset by a decline in private savings. Private 
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savings in Greece declined between 2008 and 2014, while they increased in Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain.  
Conversely, government savings increased in Greece during the same period, while 
they declined in the other countries. Thus, the austerity undergone by Greece during 
the crisis was more severe than in the other countries. During the crisis, public debt 
to GDP followed explosive dynamics, rising from 103.1% in 2007 and 126.8% in 2009 
to 177.1% in 2014. The increase resulted from the deficits ran during the crisis and 
from the drop in GDP. The debt restructuring agreed in 2012 countered these eﬀects 
somewhat.8  
Greece eliminated its primary budget deficit in 2014—it ran a primary surplus of 0.4% 
in that year. The ratio of private-sector loans to GDP declined slowly during the crisis. 
As Figure 6 shows, it stood at almost the same level as Portugal’s and Spain’s in 2014, 
and above Ireland’s and Italy’s. The slow decline of private-sector loans to GDP in 
Greece is due to the sharp decline in GDP and the relatively slow pace of resolving 
non-performing loans. 
 
3.  Benchmarking the Greek Crisis 
The previous section argued that Greece experienced three quasi simultaneous and 
interlinked shocks: a sudden stop, with the abrupt withdrawal of private foreign 
capital starting in 2009; a sovereign debt crisis, with rapidly deteriorating fiscal 
accounts in 2008 and 2009, culminating in a sovereign default in 2012; and a banking 
crisis with the bursting of a boom in credit to the private non-financial sector in 2008 
and 2009. This section provides a systematic comparison between Greece and other 
countries experiencing each type (and sometimes combinations) of similar shocks. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The figures for Greek government debt during the crisis overstate the value of the debt, especially when Greece is 
compared to other high-debt countries such as Italy and Portugal. This is because Greek debt is computed in nominal  
terms, by adding the principal (face value) payments that are due in all future years, rather than by adding all principal  
and coupon payments after discounting them at appropriate market rates. This overstates the value of the debt 
because assistance loans by the EZ during the crisis came with long maturities and below market interest rates. In 
particular, the average interest rate on Greek debt is smaller than for Italy and Portugal. For estimates of Greek debt in 
present-value terms see, for example, Schumacher and Weder di Mauro (2015). 
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3.1  The incidence of crisis 
 
We begin by identifying episodes of sudden stops, sovereign defaults and lending 
booms/busts. 
Sudden stops. Starting with the work of  Dornbusch and Werner (1994),  Calvo et al. 
(2006), Adalet  and Eichengreen (2007) and many others, an abundant literature has 
explored the macroeconomic consequences of a sudden reversal in foreign lending. 
Calvo et al. (2006), in particular, compiled a list of 33 sudden stop episodes between 
1980 and 2004 for a sample of 31 emerging markets. In the authors’ classification, a 
sudden stop is identified by the combination of (a) a reversal in capital flows, (b) an 
increase in emerging market bond spreads, capturing times of global stress on 
financial markets, and (c) a large drop in domestic output.  Mendoza (2010) adopts a 
similar classification, while Korinek and Mendoza (2014) extend the Calvo et al. 
(2006) sample to 2012 and to advanced economies.9 As in these earlier papers, we 
define the year t of a sudden stop episode as the year of a sharp reduction in foreign 
lending that coincides with a large decline in output.10 With this criterion, we identify 
49 sudden stop events, 36 for emerging market economies and 13 for advanced 
economies (see Table 3). 
Sovereign defaults. We identify sovereign debt crisis as in  Gourinchas and Obstfeld 
(2012). The year t of a sovereign debt crisis corresponds to the year identified with a 
default on domestic or external public debt, as tabulated by  Reinhart and Rogoﬀ 
(2009),  Cantor and Packer (1995); Chambers (2011); Moody’s (2009); Sturzenegger 
and Zettelmeyer (2007).11 Since 1980, we record 64 default episodes in emerging 
market economies, and one in an advanced economy: Greece in 2012. 
Lending booms/busts. Credit boom episodes are defined as in  Gourinchas et al. 
(2001), from the deviation of the ratio of credit to the non-financial sector to output 
from its trend.12 A lending boom episode is recorded when this cyclical deviation 
                                                          
9
 Like Calvo et al. (2006), Korinek and Mendoza (2014) focus on ‘systemic’ sudden stops that occur in times of turmoil on 
global bond markets. 
10
 The appendix provides additional details. In short, we identify large output drops when the peak-to-trough cumulated 
output decline in a recession exceeds the median cumulated output decline within group (advanced or emerging 
markets). A sudden stop occurs when this large output drop overlaps a capital flow reversal episode, defined as a year-
on-year decline in net capital inflows that is more than two standard deviations away from the country mean. 
11
 See Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) for details. 
12
 See details in the appendix. 
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exceeds a given boom threshold. The year t of the lending boom then coincides with 
the year in which the maximum (positive) deviation of credit to GDP occurs. Our 
calculations identify 114 lending boom episodes, 96 of which in emerging market 
economies. 
Finally, we identify ‘Trifecta’ episodes: sovereign defaults that coincide with a lending 
boom and a sudden stop.13 We find nine such crises for emerging markets, including 
well-known episodes such as Mexico in 1982, Chile and Uruguay in 1983, Indonesia 
and Russia in 1998, Ecuador in 1999, Argentina and Turkey in 2001 and Uruguay again 
in 2003. Again, Greece is the only advanced economy to have experienced a ‘Trifecta’ 
crisis in our sample. Table 3 reports the incidence of each type of crisis for advanced 
and emerging market economies. It illustrates the relative prevalence of sovereign 
defaults, lending booms and ‘Trifecta’ crises among emerging economies. By contrast, 
sudden stops are roughly distributed in proportion to the number of countries in each 
group in our sample. 
We compare each type of episode to the Greek crisis. For the purpose of this 
exercise, we consider that the Greek episode begins in 2010.14 
 Sudden Stop Sovereign Default Lending Boom Trifecta # Countries 
Advanced Economies 13 1 18 1 22 
Emerging Markets 36 64 96 9 57 
Total 49 65 114 10 79 
 
Table 3: Crises Incidence in Advanced and Emerging Economies, 1980-2014. Details on how each type of 
episode is identified are in the appendix. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Technically, we record a ‘Trifecta’ episode when the sovereign default event t occurs during a lending boom episode 
and during a sudden stop episode. 
14
 Diﬀerent dimensions of the Greek crisis unfolded at diﬀerent times. According to our dating procedure, the lending 
boom peaked in 2008, the sovereign default occurred in 2012 and the collapse in output during the sudden stop 
episode occurred in 2013. Nevertheless 2010 is a natural starting point since specific concerns about the Greek 
economy arose first in late 2009. The 5-yr spread between Greece and Germany was 120bp in September 2009, but 
climbed to 277bp by January 2010, before reaching 680bp by April of that year. 
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3.2  The data 
 
We construct a database of macro variables for a large sample of advanced and 
emerging economies between 1980 and 2014.15 The sample contains 22 advanced 
economies (including Greece) and 57 emerging market economies, distributed across 
six broad regions. The list of emerging market economies includes all countries 
classified as emerging according to leading outlets and are therefore reasonably well 
integrated into global bond markets.16  
In the spirit of a large literature in international macroeconomics, we examine the 
behaviour of key macroeconomic variables around the three types of shocks 
discussed above: sudden stops, sovereign debt crises, and lending boom/busts 
episodes, as well as Trifecta crises.17 Our event study considers the response of eight 
macroeconomic variables: output, consumption, investment, exports and imports of 
goods and services, the trade balance, credit to the non-financial sector, and public 
debt. The data is collected from the World Bank’s Development Indicators, the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics and Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) estimates of total 
(domestic and external) gross public debt for a large number of countries.18 In 
addition to these macroeconomic variables, we use Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) and 
Ilzetzki et al. (2010) de facto exchange rate regime classification and sort countries 
into ‘pegs’ or ‘floats’ based on the exchange rate regime in the year preceding the 
episode. Further, we split ‘pegs’ into ‘de-peggers’, i.e. countries that abandon their 
peg within two years of the shock, and ‘strict peggers’ who maintain their peg for at 
least two years. This will allow us to contrast the macroeconomic response of 
countries based on their post-shock exchange rate regime. This is an important 
consideration given the argument -often heard- that the main constraint on the 
Greek economy is its lack of nominal exchange rate flexibility (for instance see 
Krugman (2012)). 
                                                          
15
 We choose to begin in 1980 because of data availability and also because this period marks a phase of growing 
international financial integration, especially for emerging market economies. 
16
 Our list includes all countries listed as emerging economies in either J.P. Morgan’s EMBIG index, the FTSE’s Group of 
Advanced or Secondary Emerging Markets, the MSCI-Barra classification of Emerging, or Frontier economies and the 
Dow Jones list of Emerging Market Economies. We add to these countries Israel, Hong-Kong and Singapore, all countries 
that are now often included in the group of advanced economies but belong to the group of emerging market 
economies for most of the sample. The list of countries in our sample is included in the appendix. 
17
 See Eichengreen et al. (1995) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for seminal contributions. 
18
 Detailed sources for each variable are provided in the appendix. 
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3.3  Findings 
 
Figure 8 reports the output response to a typical sudden stop across the 48 episodes 
(excluding Greece). It measures output per capita, relative to its pre-crisis level at t-2, 
in 100-log points, so that a value of x indicates that output per capita is ex/100 times 
pre-crisis output. The figure also includes point-wise one-sided 10% confidence 
intervals (the greyed area), as well as the trajectory of Greek output (in red with 
bullets) during the 2010 episode. As expected, since our definition of sudden stops 
requires a large output drop, the mean response indicates a sharp decline in output, 
marginally significant, close to 10% below its peak in the year of the sudden stop, 
followed by a gradual recovery. By year t+2, output has typically recovered to its pre-
crisis level and continues to expand.  
 
Figure 8: The response of output to a sudden stop. The figure reports real output per capita relative to 
period t – 2, in 100 log-points for a typical sudden stop episode (with output collapse) and for Greece in the 
2010 crisis. See the appendix for data sources. 
Two facts are relevant here. First, Greece experienced a strikingly worse output 
decline. By 2013, i.e. t + 3, Greek output per capita was 25% below it pre-crisis level 
(e–0.29 = 0.75), significantly below the average response and showing few signs of 
recovery. Second, unlike the typical sudden stop, Greece’s output path was 
‘backloaded.’ The initial recession in 2009 and 2010 (t –1 and t) is similar to a typical 
sudden stop episode and milder than the subsequent decline in Greek output. By 
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contrast, typical episodes are ‘front loaded’ with a more pronounced ‘V’ shape.19 
 
Claim 1. The Greek crisis was significantly more severe, persistent and backloaded 
than the typical sudden stop. 
Figure 9 reports a similar analysis for the consumption and investment ratios to 
output. As for output, each variable is expressed in 100-log points, relative to its value 
at t-2, i.e. at the beginning of the episode. Equivalently, this figure reports the growth 
diﬀerential between consumption or investment and output since t – 2. 
 
Figure 9: The response of consumption and investment to a sudden stop. The figure reports the 
consumption-output ratio (left panel) and the investment output ratio (right panel) relative to period t – 2; in 
100 log-points for a typical sudden stop episode (with large output collapse) and for Greece in 2010. See the 
appendix for data sources. 
The left panel reports the consumption-to-output ratio. In a typical sudden stop, 
consumption mostly moves in line with output. Instead, Greek consumption grew 
modestly faster than output, although not significantly so. The right panel reports the 
investment-to-output ratio. Greek investment collapsed dramatically, much more so 
than in a typical sudden stop. By 2013, i.e. t + 3, the investment-to-output ratio was 
less than half of its pre-crisis level (e–0.76 = 0.47), while a typical sudden stop sees a 
decline of 20% to 30%. Given the decline in output per capita documented in Figure 
                                                          
19
 By dating the Greek crisis in 2010 instead of later – see fn. 14– it may appear as if we mechanically make the Greek 
output collapse more protracted compared to other episodes where the output collapse may have started before t – 2. 
This is not a concern: the median duration of output collapses in our sample of sudden stops is 1.5 years for advanced 
economies and 1 year for emerging market economies. Only two output collapses last for six years or longer: Bosnia 
between 2008 and 2014 (six years) and Ukraine between 1992 and 1999 (seven years). Hence our choice of 2010 as the 
crisis year for Greece does not aﬀect the results. 
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8, real investment per capita collapsed by almost two-thirds between 2008 and 2013 
(0.75 х 0.47 = 0.35). 
Claim 2. The collapse in Greek aggregate investment in this crisis was unprecedented 
in its persistence and magnitude, in comparison to the typical sudden stop. 
A sudden withdrawal of foreign capital is only one of the shocks that Greece 
experienced since 2009 and one might be concerned that the previous comparison 
might be too unfavourable to Greece. For instance, like Greece in 2010, Argentina in 
2001, Chile in 1983 or Indonesia in 1998, among others, experienced a simultaneous 
drying-up of foreign capital, a sovereign default and a collapse in lending, i.e. a 
‘Trifecta’ shock. These episodes are amongst the worst documented economic crises 
in post-war history, often accompanied by a banking crisis, and unprecedented levels 
of economic hardship and political turmoil. In light of the economic and political 
dislocation associated with it, one would expect the Greek crisis to be on a 
comparable scale. To investigate this, Figure 10 reports the average output response 
to each of the following shocks: a sovereign default, a lending boom/bust, as well as 
the ‘Trifecta’ shock that consists of these two shocks occurring during a sudden stop 
episode. As an additional point of comparison, the figure also includes the average 
output response for Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, i.e. the other peripheral 
countries most aﬀected by the Eurozone crisis (under the label ‘IIPS’). Finally, the 
graph also includes 10% point-wise one-sided confidence intervals for the ‘Trifecta’ 
shocks. 
 
Figure 10: The response of output to various crises. The figure reports the mean output per capita relative to 
period t – 2; in 100 log-points for various episodes, and for Greece in 2010. 10% one-sided point-wise 
confidence intervals for ‘Trifecta’ episodes. See the appendix for data sources. 
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The figure illustrates how much of an outlier the Greek crisis truly was. While output 
per capita initially declined in line with that of a ‘Trifecta’ crisis, by 2011 (i.e. t + 1), 
output had declined significantly more and kept falling. By contrast, in a typical 
‘Trifecta’ crisis, output is back to its pre-crisis level by t + 3: The figure allows us to 
make a number of additional points. First, ‘Trifecta’ crises are more severe than a 
typical default crisis, although the diﬀerences are small and often insignificant. 
Second following a lending boom, output keeps growing. This is because many 
lending booms in our sample are not always followed by an economic downturn or 
crisis, as noted also by Gourinchas et al. (2001) and Ranciere et al. (2008). Lastly, the 
trajectory for the ‘IIPS’ countries illustrates that, in these countries too, the crisis has 
been much more persistent than expected, with output still 7% below pre-crisis level 
as of 2014 (t + 4). 
Claim 3. The collapse in Greek output per capita has been significantly more severe 
and more persistent than the typical ‘Trifecta’ crisis. 
Figure 11 makes the same point even more vividly. The panel on the left reports the 
output trajectory for all countries that experienced a sudden stop in our sample. The 
panel on the right presents similar results for all ‘Trifecta’ episodes. Both panels also 
report the Greek 2010 episode.  
    
 
Figure 11: The distribution of output responses to sudden stops and ‘Trifecta’ crises. The figure reports 
output per capita relative to period t – 2; in 100 log-points for each sudden stop episode (left panel), and for 
each ‘Trifecta’ crises (right panel), together with Greece in 2010. See the appendix for data sources. 
As is clear from both figures, Greece’s economic performance is cumulatively much 
worse than all episodes from the last 35 years, including crises such as Argentina in 
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2001, or Uruguay in 1983, with the single exception of the United Arab Emirates crisis 
of 2009.20 
We next consider the role of the exchange rate regime. Our dataset includes 
information on the de-facto exchange rate regime from Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) 
and Ilzetzki et al. (2010). We use this data to construct an indicator of the exchange 
rate regime in the year of the shock and the preceding year (peg/float). 
We further subdivide pegs based on whether countries maintain their peg for at least 
two years after the crisis (strict peggers) or abandoned it (de-peggers).21 Figure 12 
contrasts the output response following an emerging market sudden stop for de-
peggers, strict peggers and floaters, together with that of Greece and of the IIPS 
countries. The figure also includes 10% point-wise one-sided confidence intervals for 
strict peggers. Unsurprisingly, we find that strict peggers experience a worse 
adjustment than de-peggers, who in turn perform worse than floaters: by t + 4, 
output is still 4% below its pre-crisis level for strict peggers, while it is 3% (resp. 8%) 
above trend for de-peggers (resp. floaters): a more flexible exchange rate regime is 
associated with a less severe and less persistent crisis. Greece’s experience is very 
singular in that respect as well: its output loss is much larger and significantly more 
persistent than for countries that maintained their exchange rate. By contrast, the 
experience of the ‘IIPS’ countries is more in line with that of ‘strict peggers’, albeit 
less severe in 2010 and 2011 (t and t + 1). 
There are two ways to think about this result. One possible interpretation is that the 
severity of the Greek crisis cannot be attributed entirely to the strictures of the 
common currency, since it significantly underperformed other ‘strict fixers.’ This 
would direct our attention towards other features of the Greek economy than just 
the exchange rate regime. This is not the only interpretation. Clearly, countries can 
and often choose their exchange rate regime in response to the economic 
environment. Therefore, the sample of ‘strict fixers’ may consist precisely of 
countries who stand to lose relatively less from keeping the exchange rate pegged in 
the aftermath of a sudden stop. This could be the case in particular if these countries 
were experiencing a relatively modest decline in output. To investigate this question 
                                                          
20
 The economy of the United Arab Emirates experienced a sudden stop episode in 2009, as a consequence of the burst 
of a real estate bubble, and the sharp decline in oil and natural gas prices in the immediate aftermath of the Global 
Financial Crisis. real output per capita declined by 11 percent, 10.7 percent and 16.4 percent in 2007, 2008 and 2009 
respectively, culminating with the collapse of Dubai World in November 2009. 
21
 We classify countries into peggers and floaters based on the ‘fine classification’ of Ilzetzki et al. (2010). Peggers have 
an index smaller than 9. The sample consists of 20 floats, 10 strict peggers, 15 de-peggers and 2 others. 
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further, Figure 13 reports the data for strict fixers, alongside that for Estonia, Latvia 
and Greece.  
 
Figure 12: The role of the exchange rate regime. The figure reports output per capita relative to period t – 2; 
in 100 log-points for Emerging Market Sudden Stops, by exchange rate regime, together with Greece in 2010. 
10% one-sided point-wise confidence intervals for ‘strict peggers’. See the appendix for data sources. 
 
Figure 13: Output response for ‘strict peggers’. The figure reports output per capita relative to period t – 2; 
in 100 log-points for Emerging Market strict peggers, together with Estonia (2009), Latvia (2009) and Greece 
(2010). One-sided 10% point-wise confidence intervals for ‘strict peggers’. See the appendix for data sources. 
Both Latvia and Estonia experienced severe recessions following their 2009 sudden 
stop episode. Estonia’s output per capita declined by 19% between 2007 and 2009, 
while that of Latvia declined by 17% between 2007 and 2010. Nevertheless, both 
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countries chose to maintain their peg to the euro and ‘doubled down’ by 
subsequently adopting the common currency, in January 2011 for Estonia and 
January 2014 for Latvia. Overall, both countries have an experience similar to that of 
the full sample of strict peggers. Yet, it could hardly be argued that the costs of 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate were small for either country. Instead, their 
decision to carry forward and adopt the Euro can be related to historical and geo-
strategic reasons, in particular the desire to anchor their country firmly in the West. 
Both countries, therefore, adopted the euro despite the large short run costs 
associated with doing so: the comparison of their trajectory with Greece’s is unlikely 
to suﬀer from a strong selection bias. It is therefore interesting that the experience of 
Greece appears significantly worse than either country.22 
Claim 4. The Greek crisis was significantly more severe than the typical emerging 
market sudden stop, even for countries such as Latvia or Estonia that maintained a 
fixed exchange rate in the aftermath of a sudden stop with large output collapse. 
Figure 14 reports credit to the non-financial sector (left panel) and public debt (right 
panel), relative to output. The credit-to-output ratio is measured in deviation from an 
hp-filter trend, while the debt-to-output ratio is measured relative to the country 
mean. Each variable is expressed in percent of GDP. The left panel reports 10% one-
sided point-wise confidence bands for lending boom/bust episodes, while the right 
panel reports similar confidence bands for ‘Trifecta’ episodes since these episodes 
witness the largest increase in public debt. Starting with the credit-to-output ratio, 
we see that the initial leverage was high, but not as high as in typical lending boom 
episodes, around 10% of GDP. The ratio of credit to GDP was gradually reduced, 
although at a more measured pace than in typical episodes. Overall, the contraction 
in credit to the economy is similar to what is observed in other countries. Confidence 
bands are quite large. 
                                                          
22
 There are, of course, other diﬀerences between the Baltic countries and Greece and we want to acknowledge the 
limits of the comparison. For instance, price and wages adjusted more rapidly in Latvia than in Greece.  Blanchard et al.  
(2013), in a case study of the Latvia boom, bust and recovery, argue that internal devaluation worked fast in part due to 
nominal wage cuts, but also to rapid productivity increases that fuelled a solid supply response. We explore in section 6 
what would have happened in Greece with more rapid price and wage adjustment. 
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Figure 14: Credit and Government Debt. The left panel reports the ratio of credit to the non-financial sector 
to output, in deviation from a Hodrick-Prescott trend, in percent of GDP. The right panel reports the ratio of 
government debt to output, in deviation from a country mean, in percent of GDP. Both panels report the 
typical response over each type of episode, together with Greece in 2010. One-sided 10% point-wise 
confidence intervals for lending boom (left panel) and Trifecta (right panel). See the appendix for data 
sources. 
Turning to public debt, we observe an elevated level of public debt even before the 
crisis (18% of GDP above mean in 2008), increasing rapidly and remaining significantly 
more elevated than in other episodes. We can see on the graph the eﬀect of the 2012 
debt restructuring (in t + 2), reducing the debt-to-output ratio from 80% to 60% of 
GDP above its mean, but followed by a subsequent worsening, in part due to the 
collapse in economic activity in 2013 and 2014. Compared to ‘Trifecta’ or other 
episodes, levels of public debt remain extraordinarily high and it is clear from this 
figure that eﬀorts to bring public debt back to sustainable levels have failed. 
Claim 5. Domestic leverage in Greece was similar to other lending boom/bust 
episodes and evolved similarly. By contrast, public debt to output remained 
extremely elevated. Eﬀorts to reduce the public debt burden mostly failed, despite a 
substantial debt restructuring in 2012. 
Figure 15 reports the trade balance to output ratio as well as the CPI-based 
multilateral real exchange rate compiled by the IMF. 
As for domestic credit and public debt, the trade balance-to-output ratio is measured 
in deviation from country means and expressed in percent of GDP. 
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Figure 15: Net Exports and Real Exchange Rate. The left panel reports the ratio of net exports on goods and 
services to output, in deviation from country mean, in percent of GDP. The right panel reports the 
multilateral real exchange rate, in percentage deviation from a country mean. Both panels report the typical 
response over each type of episode, together with Greece in 2010. One-sided point-wise confidence intervals 
for Trifecta episodes. See the appendix for data sources. 
The multilateral real exchange rate is expressed in percentage deviation from its 
country mean. The figure also reports 10% point-wise one-sided confidence intervals 
for sudden stop episodes. The left panel (trade balance) illustrates the gradual but 
large improvement of the Greek trade balance between 2008 and 2014, in excess of 
10% of GDP, compared to the typical sudden stop episode. Unlike typical sudden 
stops, where loss of market access forces the trade balance and current account to 
improve overnight, the overall improvement in Greece was spread out gradually. The 
cumulated improvement in the trade balance in a typical sudden stop represents 
6.2% of output, 5% of which occur in the year of the sudden stop itself. As discussed 
in the previous section, financial assistance and access to the liquidity facilities of the 
European Central Bank allowed Greece to spread out a massive and necessary 
adjustment in its trade balance. The right panel indicates that most of this adjustment 
occurred without major movements in the real exchange rate. Like other countries 
experiencing a sudden stop, Greece’s real exchange rate was initially over-
appreciated by about 13 percent. Yet, while the real exchange rate depreciates by 
10% in the aftermath of a typical sudden stop (and a massive 35% following a 
‘Trifecta’), Greece’s real exchange rate only depreciated by 4.5 percent between 2008 
and 2014. 
Claim 6. The adjustment of external balances occurred more gradually but was 
nevertheless very significant in size. The improvement in external accounts occurred 
despite any significant movement in the real exchange rate. 
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4.  Model 
This section presents a stylized model of a small open economy in a currency union, 
with rich macro-financial linkages. The model is designed to shed light on two sets of 
issues. First, we want a realistic enough model that allows us to understand which 
shocks were responsible for the performance of the Greek economy, both before and 
during of the crisis. Second, we want to use the model to perform some simple 
counterfactual exercises. To achieve these objectives, the model needs to remain 
stylized. In particular, while we introduce many macro-finance features, we abstract 
from a full micro-founded model of the banking sector that would put excessive 
constraints on the data. The model features eight exogenous stochastic processes. 
They are labelled ζ’s and each is assumed to follow an AR(1) process of the form: 
                                                                       
i
t
ii
t
ii
t   1                                                                   (1) 
where the persistence and volatility parameters (ρi, σi) are estimated from the data, 
and the innovations εit
 are i.i.d. with mean zero and unit variance, and i = {dg, 
spend,..} is the name of the shock. We next specify the government, households, non-
financial firms and the financial sector. 
 
4.1  Government 
 
Budget constraint. The government imposes a flat tax on income, spends Gt on goods 
and services and makes social transfers Tt. Let B$
g
, t – 1 be the face value (in units of the 
common currency) of the debt issued at time t – 1 and due at time t. The nominal 
budget constraint of the government, conditional on not defaulting, is 
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where PH,t is the price index of home goods (so PH,tYt is nominal GDP), τt is a time-
varying tax rate, and Rt
g is the gross interest rate on sovereign debt. It will be 
convenient to work with real variables.  
We define real government debt Bt
g ≡
tH
P
t
g
B
,
$, . We can then re-write the budget 
constraint (conditional on not defaulting) as  
  
 
31 
                                                      H
t
g
t
ttttg
t
g
t BTGY
R
B

 1                                         (3) 
where Πt
H ≡
1,
,
tH
P
tH
P
 is the domestic  (i.e. PPI) inflation rate from t – 1 to t. This formula 
makes clear that unexpected inflation at time t lowers the real debt burden. We use 
this convention for all other nominal assets. 
 
Sovereign default.  Sovereign risk plays an important role in the Greek crisis.23 We do 
not model an optimal default decision by the government. Instead, we introduce a 
default shock dgt
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1 . We assume that the function F is increasing in the real 
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  and decreasing in real GDP Yt. For instance, F could simply be 
the ratio of debt to GDP. The expected default rate is  
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Frd  |It)where It is the information set of 
investors at time t. Notice that the distribution of dgt 1
~
 can be time varying. What 
matters most in our model, however, are expected credit losses, which take into 
account the probability of default and expected loss given default. Upon default, 
government debt is reduced by some haircut and we let dgt denote expected credit 
losses. In our quantitative analysis, we adopt the following log-linear specification for 
expected credit losses at time t + 1: 
                                         (4) 
where 
Y
B g
is the average debt-to-GDP ratio, gd is a sensitivity parameter, and 
lowercase variables represent log deviations from steady state values. The sovereign 
risk shock dgt  follows an AR(1) as postulated in equation (1) with persistence 
dg  and 
volatility dg . Equation (4) states that expected default losses increase with the level 
                                                          
23
 The literature on sovereign risk is large and we can only refer the reader to the classic contribution of  Arellano  
(2008) and the recent survey by  Aguiar and Amador (2014). 
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of debt, decrease with the inflation rate –since the latter reduces the real debt 
burden, and increase with the sovereign default shock dgt . We will use data on 
sovereign yields to estimate the parameters { gd ,
dg , dg }. The rate paid by the 
government on its debt is then (in log deviations) 
g
tt
g
t drr  , 
where tr  is the international interest rate.  
Fiscal policy. The government’s spending policy and its social transfer policy are 
represented by the same rule 
                               
g
tb
g
trtntlt bFrFnFgFg 1                             (5) 
where gt is the log-deviation of spending, and nt, rt
g, and bgt are log-deviations of 
employment Nt, government credit risk spread Rt
g, and government debt Bt
g from 
their steady-state values, Fl, Fn, Fr, and Fb are fixed parameters, and 
spend
t  is a 
spending shock that follows equation  (1) with persistence spend and volatility spend .24 
We have the same rule for transfers tt. We allow spending itself to be auto-regressive 
(with Fl > 0) to capture the fact that government programs are often scheduled of 
several years. This fiscal rule implies that the fiscal authorities respond to an increase 
in sovereign debt by tightening expenditures and reducing social transfers. The term 
Fn captures automatic stabilizers: as the economy deteriorates, fiscal transfers and 
spending tends to increase. This formulation allows government expenditures and 
transfers to change both because of macro and financial channels, and also because 
of spending shocks. Lastly, we specify the following process for the tax rate: 
 t  
where tax  follows equation (1) with persistence tax and volatility tax and  is 
calibrated to the steady state. 
 
 
                                                          
24
 The rate that enters (3) is not necessarily the same as the one in (5) because debt is long term and only a fraction is 
refinanced every period. During the crisis, Greek debt was refinanced by oﬃcial creditors at low rates, in (3), while the 
secondary market rate was high. This secondary rate is the one that enters (5). 
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4.2  Households 
Household debt dynamics play an important role during the Great Recession so we 
need to introduce borrowers and savers in the model. Households are heterogeneous 
in their time preferences, as in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Martin and 
Philippon (2014).25 There are two types of households: a measure 1 of patient 
households indexed by i = s (who will be savers in equilibrium), and a measure  of 
impatient households indexed by i = b (who will be borrowers in equilibrium). These 
households have identical preferences over goods and hours worked, but diﬀer in 
their discount factors: we assume that βs>βb. Household i maximizes expected 
lifetime utility 
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where Ci,t is a bundle of home and foreign goods, defined as in Gali and Monacelli 
(2008) by 
 
where ϵh is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods and ϖ is 
the degree of openness of the economy. As usual, the home consumer price index 
(CPI) is 
 
Household default. Households borrow at the rate Rt
h and can default on their debts. 
Let htd be the credit loss rate on household loans. Default is a loss for the banks and a 
positive transfer to borrowers, similar to the financial shock described in Iacoviello 
(2015). The borrowers’ budget constraint, following the same convention as with the 
government, is 
                                                          
25
 There are two types of models with heterogeneity: models where types are transient, as in Bewley models or 
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2010); and models where types are permanent, as in Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw 
(2000), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), and Martin and Philippon (2014). Midrigan and Philippon (2010) propose a 
hybrid model that includes precautionary savings but is simple enough to incorporate in a standard macro model.  
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                                 (6) 
where   bttt NW1 denotes after tax labor income, R
h
t the gross interest rate faced by 
borrowers, Bht is the real face value of the household debt issued at t and due at t + 1, 
and Tbt the transfers received by borrowers. Borrowers are subject to the following 
borrowing limit:  
 
In our notations, Bht is a per capita measure while
h
t  denotes the aggregate lending 
capacity of the financial sector to households. We later derive this lending limit from 
the lender’s problem, and we anticipate the result that only impatient households 
borrow in equilibrium. The credit loss rate is assumed to follow the process: 
                                                                                    (7) 
where dht  follows equation (1) with persistence 
dh and volatility dh . Equation (7) 
states that the credit loss rate on household loans increases with their debt level, 
decreases with output, and increases with a household default shock dh . We will use 
data on non-performing loans to estimate { hyd , hbd dh , dh }. Note that d
h
t are realized 
credit losses at time t, unlike dgt which is an expected loss that may or may not 
materialize at t + 1.  
 
The savers’ budget constraint is  
                         (8) 
where tR
~
is the nominal after-tax gross return on savings 1, tHP 1tS at time t and 
s
tT denotes real transfers for savers. This return is a complex object since savers are 
residual claimants: in equilibrium, they hold shares of firms and of banks, but also 
deposits, government bonds and potentially foreign assets. Notice however, that in 
equation (3) we have assumed a uniform tax rate on aggregate income, and this is 
what matters in the end. The savers’ Euler equation is 
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where ttt   /11 denotes the gross CPI inflation rate from t to t+1. Finally, in the 
aggregate, we have  
s
tH
b
tHtH CCC ,,, )1(    
s
t
b
tt CCC )1(    
Nominal Wage Rigidity. We assume a standard model of wage stickiness, with a 
representative union setting wages à la Calvo. The wage equations are standard and 
satisfy: 
 
where πwt denotes wage inflation, wt is the real wage in terms of the CPI (ln(Wt/Pt)), 
w
t  is a wage-markup shock that follows  (1) with persistence 
w and volatility w . πt 
denotes CPI inflation, πht is home inflation, π
f
t is foreign inflation, and 
w  is derived 
from the Calvo wage setting process. The first equation is a forward looking wage 
Phillips curve. Wage inflation depends on expected future wage inflation, on the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, and on the wage 
markup shock w . 
 
4.3  Non-financial firms 
We separate firms into goods producing and capital producing firms in order to 
simplify the derivation of the price setting equation on the one hand, and the 
investment/Q equation on the other hand. 
Capital Producing Firms. Capital firms convert consumption goods into capital 
through investment, and rent this capital to goods producing firms for a rental rate 
Zk,t. The capital stock evolves according to 
                                                                          (9) 
and real period profits (i.e., scaled by PH,t) for these firms are given by 
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where the last term captures adjustment costs to physical capital. Let Rkt be the firm’s 
funding cost. The real value of capital producing firms is  
V(Kt-1) and satisfies the following Bellman equation: 
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tx be the net investment rate. Given our homotheticity assumptions, 
we guess and verify that the value function can be written as  
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Define Tobin’s Q as the end of period value of assets divided by the end of period 
replacement cost of capital 
                                                                                             (11) 
Optimal investment yields the standard Q-equation: 
                                                                                                                     (12) 
Goods Producing Firms. Goods producing firms produce diﬀerentiated varieties of a 
domestic good using capital and labor. The production function for a producer of 
good j is 
      
  1)()()( jNjAKjY ttt                                                                            
where labor costs wage A is aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We focus here 
on the case where TFP is constant because the model is simpler to present and fits 
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the data quite well. Goods producing firms are subject to a financial friction that 
requires them to pay part of the wage bill in advance, before production is 
undertaken as in Christiano et al. (2005) or Jermann and Quadrini (2012).26 Let 
sk denote the fraction of input cost that needs to be financed by working capital 
loans. Profits are given by 
                                          Profitst = Revenuest – Costst [1 + sk (R
k
t – 1)]. 
Standard cost minimization yields an expression for the nominal marginal cost,  
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Notice that the working capital friction can be represented by an incremental 
marginal cost for the firm. This will be an important property, as it allows financial 
frictions to pass through to inflation. Diﬀerentiated goods producers solve a standard 
Calvo problem, given factor demands. Given real marginal cost
tH
t
t
P
MC
MC
,
$
 , we can 
write the (log-linear) Phillips curve as  
, 
where p is derived from the Calvo price setting process, β is the discount factor for 
savers, and the (log) marginal cost is  
                  
 ht
 is an AR(1) price markup shock that satisfies equation (1) with persistence h and 
volatility h . Notice that marginal costs are deflated in terms of the price of home 
produced goods, hence the terms-of-trade adjustment for the real wage, which 
                                                          
26
 The assumption that this loan is intra-period is made for simplicity. The fact that the loan is made by the bank allows 
for financial shocks to pass through to the production sector, with the added advantages that: (i) we do not need to 
keep track of an extra state variable, and (ii) we avoid any complications arising from the interaction of two dynamic 
frictions: nominal rigidities and financial frictions. If debt were inter-temporal, we would have to keep track of the joint 
distribution of prices and debt, as firms with diﬀerent pre-set prices would produce diﬀerent quantities and thus borrow 
diﬀerent amounts. Intra-period loans allow us to introduce a financial friction that is static from the firm’s point of view. 
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reflects the term
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. Finally, we have the usual static optimality condition for labor 
demand: 
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4.4  Banks, sudden stop, and funding cost 
 
A fully specified model of banking intermediation as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, the financial sector data necessary to 
estimate the restrictions of such a model, such as the balance sheet of banks and its 
components are not available (see Faria-e-Castro (2016) for a more ambitious 
estimation). There is, however, one fundamental insight from the models of banking 
intermediation that is theoretically straightforward and, as we show later, empirically 
relevant. At the heart of many banking models is a capital requirement of the type 
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where Vt
bank is the franchise value of the banking sector and Bkt and B
h
t
 denote the 
outstanding loans to the corporate non-financial and household sectors respectively, 
both measured at the end of period t. Equation (13) says that bank equity Vt
bank must 
cover a fraction of the total credit exposure to firms and to households. The second 
important equation is the current account of the banking sector: 
                         (14) 
Equation (14) states that nominal bank earnings 11,  ttH E consist of repayment from 
firms and households net of default losses, minus the repayment of banks’ liabilities 
Dt. Finally, bank value solves a Bellman equation 
                (15) 
where σ is an exogenous exit rate, Λt+1 is the pricing kernel of savers, and dividends 
satisfy Divt≤Et (typically, one assumes that dividends are a fixed fraction of earnings). 
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Equations (13), (14) and (15) capture the fundamental credit channel in the economy. 
Credit losses reduce banks’ earnings (14), lower bank value (15) and tighten capital 
requirement (13). This leads to an increase in the economy’s funding cost. All else 
equal, this channel is stronger the higher is bank leverage. We capture this idea in 
two steps. First, we model the banks’ (log) funding cost rdt as  
 
where L is bank leverage (assets over equity capital) in steady state, εd is a sensitivity 
parameter to be estimated, dpt+1 measures losses on private credit portfolio 
(households and firms’ loans), and rt is a ‘sudden stop’ shock that increases funding 
costs to banks. r satisfies equation (1) with persistence ρr and volatility σr. Since we 
only have data on total non-performing loans, we will assume that loss rates on 
households’ and firms’ credit are identical: dht = d
k
t ≡ d
p
t. 
Second, we assume that banks’ funding costs are passed on to banks’ customers 
(with a constant margin that drops out in logs), therefore 
 
Note that in our notations above, rkt is the funding cost of firms, which enters directly 
the Q equations (10) and (11). For households, we had defined rht as the interest rate 
on loans, gross of expected losses, that enters the budget constraint (6). If we were to 
quote an interest rate for corporate loans, it would be , and the 
expected return would be rdt. With our assumptions, the sudden stop shock is an 
increase in the country’s funding cost above and beyond what can be explained by 
domestic intermediation spreads. 
 
4.5  Equilibrium 
All transactions with the rest of the world happen at rate rate Rt. Let NFAt denote the 
net foreign assets of the country (in units of domestic goods). By definition, NFA 
evolves as 
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As is common in the literature, we make a technical assumption to ensure 
stationarity of NFA.27 We assume that there is a (small) price impact of NFA on the 
country’s borrowing (or saving) rate:    
 
where ϵr is a small but strictly positive number. Clearing in the market for domestic 
goods requires  
              
where CFt represents aggregate foreign consumption and P
F
t the foreign CPI. ϵf is the 
demand elasticity. 
Household Debt. Banks lend to domestic households. We assume that borrowers are 
impatient enough to hit their borrowing limits, so 
. 
The basic model does not pin down a unique borrowing rate Rht. As long as R
h
t > R
d
t, 
banks are willing to lend more. As long as  
borrowers want to borrow more. In steady state, any Rh ϵ (βs
-1, βb
-1) is potentially an 
equilibrium.28 This issue is present in and out of steady state. For the steady state, 
however, a reasonable assumption is that the lending spread is pinned down by free 
entry into banking. We will directly calibrate the steady state spread Δt ≡ d
t
h
t
R
R
using 
empirical studies of financial intermediation: Philippon (2011) shows that the spread 
is remarkably stable in the long run at Δ= 1.02. Out of steady state, we expect both 
                                                          
27
 See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). 
28
 To see why simply pick some Rh ϵ (βs
-1
, βb
-1
). Given this rate and the other parameters, there is a unique steady state 
for bank equity, bank size, etc. Hence there is a unique value for B
h
. Now, as long as interest payments do not violate 
the non-negativity constraint on consumption (which never happens for reasonable values), then this level of B
h
 also 
satisfies the households’ problem since for them B
h
 is a constraint. This shows that any Rh ϵ (βs
-1
, βb
-1
) is potentially an 
equilibrium, corresponding to diﬀerent values of B
h
. 
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loan supply and loan demand to decrease in response to an increase in bank’s 
funding cost, so we specify, in log deviations from steady-state values:  
                                                                                (16) 
where bht is an AR(1) shock that satisfies (1) with persistence ρ
bh and volatility σbh.  
Interest Rates and Funding Costs in the Model. There are four interest rates in the 
model, so it is useful to summarize them here. First of all, there is the baseline 
interest rate rt that enters the NFA and the Euler equation of savers. Above and 
beyond this rate there are spreads and expected losses, so that 
 
                            
Notice our assumptions here. First, domestic savers do not earn higher expected 
returns when there is a sudden stop. They earn r, which remains essentially constant 
and equal to the rate in the Eurozone. Second, the banks are sensitive to the sudden 
stop and to credit losses. The sudden stop rt enters the economy via the banks, 
which then pass it on to their customers. Non-performing loans dpt+1 hurt banks and 
increase the funding costs of all private agents. We only have data on total non-
performing loans, so we do not model separately firm and household defaults. We 
assume that they move together and we estimate only one equation for dpt. The 
shock deft captures the evolution of NPLs that is not predicted by macroeconomic 
fundamentals. 
Fourth, the government is not necessarily aﬀected by the same sudden stop as the 
private sector. The shock dgt  raises the cost of funds for the government. It captures 
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pessimism by investors about the creditworthiness of the government, whether or 
not this pessimism is borne out in equilibrium. There are many reasons why dgt  and 
r
t are diﬀerent, but let us just mention two. First as we discussed, the ECB provided 
funding to Greek banks both directly and indirectly via Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance, insulating them from sovereign risk, in particular during the sovereign 
debt restructuring. Second government debt is now largely held by oﬃcial creditors, 
rather than domestic banks, insulating sovereign debt from banking risk. 
Finally, while the two shocks r and dg  are conceptually distinct, the model features 
important feedback loops between the sovereign and the banks. This ‘doom loop’ has 
been extensively discussed in policy circles and analyzed in stylized models (see 
Brunnermeier et al. (2016) and Farhi and Tirole (2016)). The impact of banks on the 
sovereign is always present via general equilibrium eﬀects and tax revenues. If banks 
experience a sudden stop, the economy contracts and credit risk, both private and 
sovereign, increases. Conversely, if sovereign risk increases, the worsening of 
economic outcomes increases default in the private sector, aﬀecting bank values. 
Hence, our model features rich and complex interactions between the financial and 
public sectors. 
 
5. Estimation 
In this section, we describe the estimation of the model. We combine the Kalman 
Filter with Bayesian techniques, which allow us to recover estimates for the structural 
shocks that aﬀected Greece during the 2000’s. These estimated shocks can then be 
used to conduct counterfactual exercises. 
 
5.1  Data, observables and calibration 
The sample is annual, from 1999 to 2015. Figure 16 shows the eight series that we 
feed into the model, all measured in log deviations from steady-state. For interest 
rates and inflation, we also take the diﬀerence from the Eurozone average series. The 
model features as many shocks as observables, which are described in Table 4.29 
                                                          
29
 We treat the sovereign spread as a secondary market price that contains information about sovereign risk. On the 
other hand, it does not enter the government budget constraint since Greece did not refinance its stock of debt at that 
price. In the budget constraint we scale down the spread by a factor of 5 so that it is in line with the data. 
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Figure 16: Observables: Filtered Data. Notes: All series are in log deviations from steady state. Interest rates 
and inflation rates are also in deviation from the Eurozone average. NPL, GDP deflator and wages are 
assumed to be measured with errors. 
In addition, we allow measurement error to domestic inflation, wage inflation, and 
the measure of non-performing loans since these variables are quite noisy and or 
measured imprecisely. Specifically, we assume that we observe tx
~ , where 
                                                                 
error
ttt xx 
~
 
and errort is a measurement error term.
30 For household debt, we take as a proxy the 
series for total credit to the private non-financial sector for Greece. 
We use a combination of calibration and estimation. We calibrate parameters that 
aﬀect steady state variables. Most of the calibrated parameters take standard values 
for small open economies and are reported in Tables 10, 11 and 12 in the appendix. 
We estimate the remaining “dynamic” parameters using standard Bayesian 
estimation techniques following An and Schorfheide (2007).31 
 
                                                          
30
 In practice, as we will see, domestic inflation deviates most from the model in 2010. According to the Bank of Greece, 
that year saw a surge in inflation due to a significant rise in oil prices and an increase in indirect taxes, in particular VAT. 
31
 The “dynamic” parameters are those parameters that are not required to compute the steady state and that only 
aﬀect the dynamics of the model, such as the pass-through elasticities and the persistence as well as the standard 
deviation of the exogenous shocks (ρ
i
, σ
i
). 
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Observable Description Shock Shock Description 
Gt + Tt Government spending 
spend
t  Govt. spending shock 
tt Y  Government revenues 
tax
t  Tax rate shock 
g
tR  Greek government spread over EZ average 
dg
t  Sovereign risk shock 
k
tR  SME spread over EZ average 
r
t  Funding cost shock 
exp (
p
td ) Non-performing loans/total loans, def = npl 
def
t  Private default shock 
t  Greece CPI - EZ CPI 
h
t
  PPI cost push shock 
h
tB  Household debt 
bh
t  Household credit shock 
w
t  Greek Wage Inflation - EZ Wage Inflation 
w  Wage inflation shock 
Table 4: Observables and shocks 
We estimate a total of 25 parameters: the persistence and volatility of the eight 
structural shocks, the variance of the three measurement errors, as well as six other 
dynamic parameters: the elasticity of expected sovereign default losses with respect 
to debt to GDP, the elasticities of private default with respect to GDP and debt, the 
persistence of the household credit equation, the elasticity of household credit with 
respect to the cost of funds, and the pass-through of future default to current lending 
rates. The estimation results, along with our choice of priors, are described in Table 
14 in the appendix.  
 
5.2  Results 
Smoothed Variables. The smoothed shocks are reported in Figure 32 in the Appendix. 
We also use the Kalman Filter to extract the sequences implied by the model for the 
remaining endogenous variables. This provides a good way of gauging the fit of the 
model. We present the most important series in Figure 17, where we plot the data 
and model-implied paths for GDP, Corporate Investment, PPI Inflation and Net 
Exports-to-GDP ratio.  
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Figure 17: Smoothed Variables. Note: The figure reports the model estimated values of output, investment, 
inflation (price and wage) and next exports to GDP ratio. Both inflation series are part of the estimation but 
are assumed to be measured with error. 
The main point to take away from Figure 17 is that the model’s predictions for output 
and investment are good, even though we did not use any data on output or 
investment in the estimation. This means that our fiscal and financial multipliers are 
consistent with the data. For domestic price inflation, whose measurement is 
imperfect, we plot the observed raw data series against the model-based series that 
filters out the noise.32 For wage inflation, on the other hand, measurement errors 
appear small. 
Figures 18- 21 are the first main findings of the model. In each case, the black line is 
the smoothed value of the corresponding endogenous variable, in percent deviations 
from steady state. Each colored bar represents the contribution of a corresponding 
shock and its lagged values to the predicted value of the corresponding variable at 
each point in time.33 
                                                          
32
 As discussed earlier, the model implies that domestic inflation starts declining as early as 2008. In the data, we 
observe a spike in domestic inflation in 2009 and 2010, most likely due to the impact of oil prices (not modelled) and 
changes in the VAT rate (not modelled). 
33
 Knowledge of the structural shocks and the structural matrices that describe the law of motion for the endogenous 
variables as functions of the states allows us to estimate the contribution of each shock to the observed behavior of 
each variable in the model. This can be done for any endogenous variable, observed or not. Note that the plotted 
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GDP. The GDP series in Figure 18 shows how our model interprets the Greek crisis. 
Around 2000, credit demand is high and credit risk is low, so households borrow and 
consume. During that period, government spending increases more than predicted by 
our fiscal rule, as captured by the positive spending shocks. This is the same finding as 
in Martin and Philippon (2014). This massive fiscal expansion explains most of the 
output gap, which is around +15% in 2007. The recessionary shocks arrive in 
sequence. The model finds that the sudden stop starts in 2009 and remains very 
significant until 2013, depressing output by 5% to 10%. It is important to keep in mind 
that this is a decomposition with respect to shocks, not propagation mechanisms. For 
example, the sudden stop shock appears first in the funding cost of the private sector. 
But its eﬀects propagate via several mechanisms: lower credit, lower demand, more 
private and sovereign default risk, etc. The eﬀect of all of these mechanisms is 
aggregated into the bar corresponding to the sudden stop shock (green bar).  
 
Figure 18: Decomposition of GDP and Investment. Note: The figure reports the decomposition of the 
predicted path for output (left panel) and investment (right panel) into the contribution of each of the eight 
shocks. 
Role of Government Spending. It is important to understand how exactly the model 
interprets fiscal policy shocks. We feed in actual government spending in our 
calibration, and since the model implies significant fiscal multipliers (around 1.5), 
fiscal dynamics “accounts” for much of GDP dynamics. But that is not how the model 
computes the contribution of each shock. The model seeks to understand why 
                                                                                                                                                                      
contributions of the shocks do not need to add up to the value of the variable due to initial conditions estimated by the 
Kalman filter. 
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government spending moves using the fiscal rule (5). Government default risk 
increases in 2011 and especially in 2012, the year of the sovereign default. From 2010 
to 2012, there is no autonomous negative spending shock. In other words, the 
observed path of government spending can be explained by our fiscal rule, given the 
increase in funding costs.34 In reality, spending was largely determined by oﬃcial 
financing. Under the 2010 program, the Greek government received 110 billion Euros. 
Another 130 billion Euros became available as part of the 2012 program and debt 
restructuring. What the model says is that the size of the program (and the implied 
path of spending and taxes) was consistent with a fiscal rule such as (5). 
Autonomous (negative) spending shocks emerge in 2013 and to a lesser extent 2014 
because sovereign spreads decrease and spending does not increase (or even 
decrease). This coincides with the implementation of the 2012 IMF and Eurogroup 
program. Figure 19 reports the decomposition for government debt (left panel) and 
its yield (right panel). Both variables are part of the estimation. We see that the 
accumulation of government debt is mostly the consequence of past spending 
decisions. Fiscal expansions do not increase debt much in the short run because GDP 
and revenues increase. In the long run however they increase debt. The debt 
accumulation after the crisis in Figure 19 is mostly due to spending shocks that 
happened before the crisis. The yield on sovereign debt is also mostly aﬀected by the 
fiscal shock, and also by sovereign risk. We observe a sharp decline in sovereign risk 
following the 2012 debt restructuring. 
                
Figure 19: Decomposition of Govt. Debt and Yield. Note: The figure reports the decomposition of the 
predicted path for sovereign debt (left panel) and the yield on sovereign debt (right panel) into the 
contribution of each of the eight shocks. 
                                                          
34
 Remember that we do not assume that the Greek government actually borrowed at these rates. In equation (3) the 
cash flows are much more stable. 
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Mark-ups and non-performing loans. Finally, starting in 2013, two important factors 
dragging down the Greek economy are the rise in non-performing loans, and the 
increase in price mark-ups. As in Agatha Christie’s ‘Murder on the Orient Express’, the 
boom and bust in Greek output per capita cannot be attributed to a single cause: 
over time, diﬀerent shocks played a role. This decomposition also indicates that, by 
2015, the external drags on the Greek economy due to the sudden stop and the 
sovereign debt crisis have subsided. What remains are mostly domestic factors: some 
fiscal austerity, mounting losses on private loans, and the relative lack of adjustment 
in Greek prices relative to wages.  
Investment (Figure 18, right panel) is mostly aﬀected by the increase in funding costs 
due to the sudden stop in 2009-2013. In 2014 and 2015, investment remains subdued 
largely because of private sector credit risk, fiscal austerity and especially price mark-
up shocks. 
Figure 20 reports both expected private defaults (left panel) and the funding cost of 
the private sector (right panel). Both variables are also perfectly predicted by the 
model, by construction. Private credit losses were low early in the sample because of 
low private default risk, and the strong stimulus coming from government spending.  
 
Figure 20: Decomposition of Private Default and Funding Cost.  Note: The figure reports the decomposition 
of the predicted path for household credit losses (left panel) and the borrowing rate (right panel) into the 
contribution of each of the eight shocks. 
After 2007, private credit losses mount rapidly, mostly as a con-sequence of macro 
dynamics. The increase in funding costs due to the sudden stop, the collapse in credit 
demand, fiscal austerity and the increase in private default risk all contribute to raise 
private credit losses.  
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The right panel illustrates that the main driver of private sector cost of funds was the 
sudden stop.35  
Figure 21 reports government spending (left panel) and revenues (right panel). 
Government spending is largely autonomous in the boom, a finding consistent with 
Martin and Philippon (2014).  
In the bust, it is explained by the funding constraint, and then by restrictions 
consistent with the IMF/Eurogroup program. Government revenues are dominated 
by macro dynamics. While tax shocks move from negative to positive, revenues 
decline overall due to the sudden stop and its eﬀect on output and investment, the 
impact of spending cuts on output, and mounting non-performing loans. 
Finally, Figure 22 decomposes domestic price (left panel) and wage inflation (right 
panel). Fiscal austerity, private sector default and wage compression (negative wage 
markup shocks) contribute to deflationary price and wages forces. Yet wage 
adjustment is significantly larger than price adjustment, and the diﬀerence can largely 
be attributed to price markup shocks h . 
 
Figure 21: Decomposition of Govt. Spending and Revenues. Note: The figure reports the decomposition of 
the predicted path for government spending (left panel) and government revenues (right panel) into the 
contribution of each of the eight shocks. 
                                                          
35
 As in the case of sovereign yields, one may argue that the borrowing rate for Small and Medium Enterprises may not 
have been allocative at that time. However, recall that Greek banks could obtain liquidity at the ECB and the Bank of 
Greece against eligible collateral. Hence the supply of loanable funds to the private sector was presumably not vertical. 
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Figure 22: Decomposition of Domestic Price and Wage Inflation. Note: The figure reports the decomposition 
of the predicted path for domestic price and wage inflation into the contribution of each of the eight shocks. 
 
5.3  Impulse responses 
We next explore the internal mechanics of the model by plotting some impulse 
response functions, estimated at the posterior mean of the parameters. Each impulse 
response reports the eﬀect of a one standard deviation shock on the variables of the 
model, expressed in percent deviation from their steady state. We present here only 
a few impulse responses. Other figures are in the Appendix. Figure 23 shows the 
response to a transfer shock, 
spend
t . Our model is not Ricardian. An increase in 
government spending raises the consumption of borrowers, as well as output, 
employment, investment and inflation. As the economy expands, non-performing 
loans decline. Over time, public debt gradually increases, which pushes up sovereign 
yields. The model thus features a significant but temporary eﬀect of a fiscal expansion 
on output, and a long lasting eﬀect on the level of public debt. 
Figure 24 shows the response to a sovereign risk shock, 
dg
t . The fiscal rule forces a 
cut in spending that leads to a drop in output, employment and inflation. The decline 
in output increases private credit risk which feeds back into funding costs and curtails 
investment. Figure 24 (and Figure 33 in the appendix which looks at the response to a 
private default shock) illustrate the sovereign/bank interactions: as sovereign risk 
increases, the funding costs of the private sector are aﬀected. Conversely, as private 
default risk increases, sovereign risk increases as well. In our model, these eﬀects 
work via general equilibrium eﬀects. 
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Figure 23: Fiscal Expansion Shock 
 
Figure 24: Sovereign Risk Shock 
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Finally, Figure 25 shows the response to a sudden stop, εr. An increase in the 
country’s funding cost causes corporate investment to decline. Impatient household 
debt declines as well, and so does borrower consumption. The decline in 
consumption and investment drives output, employment and inflation down. The 
interest rate on government debt increases because the decline in economic activity 
heightens sovereign risks. 
 
6. Counterfactuals 
In this section, we run five counterfactual exercises. To understand our 
counterfactual exercises, let yit denote the observation of variable i at date t, and let 
itxˆ denote the smoothed value for variable i at date t. Let 
T
tti
T
i xx 0, }ˆ{ˆ   denote the 
estimated smoothed sequence for variable i in our sample period for t = 0,…,T and 
denote 
Txˆ the sequence of all smoothed variables: }ˆ{ˆ
T
i
T xx  . Every estimated 
sequence can be written as a mapping Γ(.) from the estimated parameters ˆ and the 
sequences of smoothed shocks, 
TK
tktk
K
k
T
k
,
0,1,1 }ˆ{}ˆ{    , where K is the number of 
shocks in our model:    KkTkTx 1}ˆ{,ˆˆ   . 
 
Figure 25: Sudden Stop 
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A counterfactual exercise consists in postulating an alternate choice for 
ˆ and
K
k
T
k 1}ˆ{  , denoted 
~
and 
K
k
T
k 1}
~{  and then compute the counterfactual 
Tx~ as:  
 KkTkTx 1}~{,
~~
   
Based on our empirical analysis of Section 3 and the analytical results of Section 5, we 
begin with a ‘low leverage’ counterfactual. In that exercise, we ask what would have 
happened, through the lens of our model, if Greece’s external and internal leverage 
had been similar to that of emerging market economies about to experience a 
sudden stop. This counterfactual is motivated by the evidence from Section 3 that 
documents the severity and persistence of the Greek crisis when compared to many 
other – especially Emerging Market economies crises. In our second counterfactual 
we ask: what would Greece have looked like without a “sudden stop” for private 
capital? Setting 
r
t = 0 for all t represents the situation that would have prevailed 
with a well-functioning European Banking Union.36 
The third counterfactual asks what would have happened if Greece had maintained 
fiscal discipline before 2007. In that counterfactual, we set 
spend
t = 0 for all t. The 
fourth counterfactual explores the role of price mark-ups and sets 
h
t
 = 0 for all t. 
This is an important exercise since the analytical decomposition of section 5 indicates 
that price mark-up shocks are an important drag on output and investment in 2014 
and 2015. Our last counterfactual considers the role of price and wage stickiness in 
the adjustment path of Greece. As discussed in Section 3, other countries such as 
Latvia or Estonia that maintained their peg in the face of a sudden stop and output 
collapse experienced a much faster recovery. We ask how much a lack of price 
flexibility may be responsible for this outcome. To do this, we reduce the calibrated 
price stickiness parameters λp and λw while keeping the sequence of shocks 
unchanged. 
 
 
                                                          
36
 We also performed another counterfactual where we remove the sudden stop on public capital by setting
dg
t = 0. 
This corresponds to the situation that would have prevailed in the presence of a sovereign debt ‘backstop’ in the form 
of ECB or bailout guaranties. These results are available upon request. 
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6.2  Low leverage economy 
 
For our first counterfactual exercise, we calibrate the Greek economy to the level of 
government, private and banking leverage observed in the typical emerging market 
economy just prior to a sudden stop. 
                Greece Typical EME Min Max 
Credit / GDP              1.01              0.46               0.025              1.46 
Sovereign Debt / GDP              1.38                0.343               0.063              0.68 
Current Account /GDP               -0.083              -0.039             -0.10 +           +0.17 
 
Table 5: Leverage and Imbalances before Sudden Stop. Notes: Average from t-6 to t-2 where t is the year of 
the sudden stop. 
Table 5 compares the leverage of Greece to the leverage of other EMs that have 
experienced a sudden stop as described in Section 3. It is clear that leverage is much 
higher in Greece along all dimensions and in particular with respect to sovereign 
debt. Typically, leverage in EMs prior to sudden stops is roughly half of that of Greece 
prior to the 2010 crisis. Accordingly, we reduce 
Y
B h , 
Y
B g , 
Y
G , 
Y
T  and bank leverage at 
the steady state by half. With these alternate parameters 
~
, and the same sequence 
of smoothed shocks 
K
k
T
k 1}{  we re-compute the path of the endogenous variables, 
Tx~ . 
Figure 26 reports the path for the actual data (in blue), the smoothed original 
estimates (in yellow) and the counterfactual (in orange). In this counterfactual, 
Greece would have been much more constrained in the build-up phase of the crisis. 
The smaller size of its government sector would have prevented it from excessively 
stimulating its economy, reducing the output gap from +14.1% in 2007 in the 
smoothed estimates to +9.2% (top left panel). Once the fiscal contraction, sudden 
stop and sovereign risk materialize, we find that they would have had a substantially 
more muted impact on the economy. For instance, the peak to trough decline in 
output is now only 22% instead of 33%. The decline in investment is also more 
muted, around 64% instead of 77%. Hence some of the excess drop in investment 
observed in Figure 9 can be attributed to the exceptional leverage of the Greek 
economy relative to other emerging economies. 
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Figure 26: Counterfactual:  Low Leverage.  Note: The figure reports the counterfactual when we the 
government, private and banking leverage to the value for EM economies prior to a sudden stop. 
Were it not for its elevated exposure levels, Greece would have experienced a more 
typical emerging market ‘Trifecta’ crisis. Similarly, limited external exposure would 
have reduced the build-up in external deficits, to -6.7% of GDP instead of -8.6%, and 
consequently imposed a smaller turnaround in the current account (+8% instead of 
+12.7%).  
 
6.2  No sudden stop shocks 
For our second counterfactual exercise, we keep our vector of estimated and 
calibrated parameters fixed, ˆ , and we recomputed Tx~ based on a new sequence of 
smoothed shocks. This new sequence is identical to the one that we estimated, with 
the exception that we set the private sudden stop shock to zero, 0ˆ 
r
t . Figure 27 
reports the results with the same convention as the previous counterfactual.  
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Figure 27: Counterfactual: No Private Sudden Stop. Note: The figure reports the counterfactual when we set 
the private sudden stop shock 0~ rt . 
The absence of a private sudden stop can be interpreted as the outcome in presence 
of a well-functioning banking union. With a European level resolution and supervision 
authority, foreign and domestic creditors would have no incentive to run. The 
counterfactual reveals that a banking union would have had almost no impact on the 
path of output during the build-up (Figure 27, top left panel). Recall that the path for 
output prior to 2007 was largely driven by high credit demand, as well as by the 
stimulative eﬀect of expansionary fiscal policies. The eventual consolidation of fiscal 
accounts was unavoidable, with or without a private sudden stop. In other words, a 
banking union would not have insulated Greece from the consequences of its past 
unsustainable fiscal policies. However, the sudden stop did contribute to worsen the 
output response once the crisis got under way. By 2013, we find that output would 
have been higher by 9 percentage points in the absence of sudden stop, although the 
diﬀerence would have subsequently declined. Much of the eﬀect of the sudden stop 
was on investment (top right panel), which would have been higher by 33 percentage 
points otherwise in 2013. 
 
6.3  Fiscal discipline 
As mentioned already many times, it is perhaps not entirely surprising that Greece 
would experience a serious downturn given the size of the needed fiscal 
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consolidation. What would have happened if instead Greece had followed a virtuous 
fiscal path since 2000? We consider this counterfactual by setting 0~ spendt , i.e. 
assuming away both the fiscal excesses of the 2000-2007 period and the subsequent 
required fiscal consolidation. Figure 28 reports the results. Not surprisingly, the crisis 
would have been much more muted, especially for output, government spending and 
net exports. Output (top left panel) would have declined by around 16% instead of 
33% between 2007 and 2013.  
Government spending (bottom right panel) would have barely increased between 
2000 and 2010, then declined a modest 8% instead of 34% relative to steady state. 
Finally the trade balance would have started to improve as early as 2006.37 
 
Figure 28: Counterfactual: Fiscal Discipline. Note: The figure reports the counterfactual when we set the 
spending shocks. 
 
 
                                                          
37
 In our model, eliminating fiscal profligacy would not have eliminated the Greek crisis altogether because we are still 
keeping the sudden stop and sovereign risk shocks. Our estimates of the benefit of fiscal discipline are only a lower 
bound. This is the main diﬀerence with Martin and Philippon (2014) who estimate the impact of sovereign debt on the 
sudden stop itself. Martin and Philippon (2014) find much larger benefits of fiscal discipline, but their estimation 
requires cross-sectional information from diﬀerent countries and is not feasible here. 
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6.4  No mark-up shocks 
 
Next, we consider the relative contribution of price mark-up shocks, by studying the 
paths of the variables of the model while turning shocks to domestic 
inflation 0ˆ 
h
t
 . 
Figure 29 reports the results. The figure suggests that price mark-up shocks play an 
important role in the analysis. Perhaps surprisingly, in the absence of price mark-up 
shocks Greece would have experienced no boom (top left panel) but a bust of a 
similar magnitude. Most importantly, this counterfactual reveals that the increase in 
price mark-ups has become a significant force hindering the recovery of the Greek 
economy: without mark-up shocks, investment would have recovered to 18% of its 
steady state value (top right panel) by 2015, while output would have rebounded by 
11% of its steady state value since the trough. Interestingly, lower mark-ups would 
translate into stronger deflation, which would have adversely aﬀected government 
debt dynamics, triggering further declines in government spending (bottom right 
panel). We infer from this counterfactual analysis that price dynamics are crucial to 
the recovery of the Greek’s economy.  
 
Figure 29: Counterfactual: No Domestic Price Mark-up Shocks. Note: The figure reports the counterfactual 
when we set price mark-up shocks 0
~ ht
 . 
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Recall that in our model marginal costs include a financial component due to working 
capital. The increase in price-marginal costs mark-ups cannot, therefore, be 
attributed to an increase in financial frictions that raise the non-wage components of 
the marginal costs. Instead, our estimates indicate that market structure, lack of 
entry or lack of competition on product markets may be responsible for a very 
sluggish recovery. 
 
6.5  Latvia: low price stickiness  
 
Our final counterfactual aims to explore the role of price and wage rigidities more 
closely. Ideally, one would like to analyze how the Greek economy would have 
performed had it left the Euro and been able to depreciate its own currency. Yet this 
is not a counterfactual that we can easily analyze, at least without auxiliary 
assumptions. For instance, under a ‘Grexit’ scenario, one needs to specify what would 
happen to euro denominated liabilities.  
Instead, we ask the converse -and easier- question: what would have happened if 
prices had been more flexible in Greece? In the limit where prices are perfectly 
flexible, the nominal exchange rate regime becomes irrelevant. It is well known also 
that price and wage flexibility may work perversely, aggravating Fisherian debt-
deflation dynamics either at the zero lower bound, or under a fixed exchange rate. 
Nevertheless, the evidence of Latvia and Estonia discussed in Section 3 suggests that 
countries with more flexible wages and prices may experience shorter recessions. To 
investigate these questions, we keep the sequence of shocks fixed, and reduce the 
calibrated price stickiness parameters λp and λw, to half of their original values. 
Figure 30 reports the results. The figure indicates that Greece would have avoided a 
significant share of the boom bust cycle, with a peak to trough decline in output of 
20% instead of 33%. Similarly, investment would have declined by only 55% instead 
of 77%. The recovery in output would also have been sharper, with output in 2015 8 
percentage points above the baseline estimates. We conclude that faster price and 
wage adjustment would have dampened the boom bust cycle and accelerated the 
recovery. 
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Figure 30: Counterfactual: Low Price Stickiness. Note: The figure reports the counterfactual when we set 
wage and price stickiness λp and λw to half their calibrated values. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we analyze the macroeconomic dynamics of Greece before and during 
the crisis that it has been experiencing since 2008. This is only an interim report since, 
six years down the road, the crisis is still playing out, and the Greek economy is still 
very much on life support. Nevertheless, we believe that enough time has elapsed to 
make it possible to provide preliminary answers. We put Greek macroeconomic 
dynamics in perspective by comparing with crisis episodes in other countries, 
including sudden stops, sovereign defaults, lending booms and busts, and 
combinations of the above. We also interpret Greece’s crisis dynamics through the 
lens of a DSGE model that incorporates key features of the crisis such as sovereign 
default and financial frictions. Using the model, we decompose the movements of 
macroeconomic variables such as output and investment, into the contributions of 
diﬀerent types of shocks, including fiscal shocks and shocks to the financial sector. 
We also perform counterfactuals to examine how factors such as debt levels, fiscal 
policy, and price rigidities may have contributed to the severity of the crisis. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, Greece’s drop in output was significantly more 
severe and protracted than in the average crisis episode. Second, the unusually large 
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drop in output was accompanied by an unusually large drop in the investment-to-
output ratio. Third, much of the discrepancy can be accounted for by the higher levels 
of debt—government, private, and foreign—that Greece entered the crisis with. 
Fourth, Greece’s output drop at the early stages of the crisis appears to have been 
driven mainly by fiscal shocks and by the sudden stop (which raised funding costs). At 
the later stages of the crisis, however, the eﬀects of these shocks appear to have 
subsided, and the shocks that account for protracted drop in output appear to be the 
slow resolution of non-performing loans and price rigidities in product markets. 
Hence the micro dimension of the crisis may now have taken precedence over 
macroeconomic forces. 
While our model captures a rich set of dynamics, it undoubtedly leaves aside many 
factors that may prove to be important when the final account will be written. One 
such factor is the uncertainty about EZ exit (Grexit). That uncertainty hampered 
investment and contributed to the liquidity problems of Greek banks. Retail deposits 
in Greek banks dropped by about 50% between 2009 and 2015, while they remained 
stable or even increased in Irish, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish banks. Hence, 
uncertainty about EZ exit seems to have been much larger in Greece than in the other 
countries. Some of the eﬀects of Grexit may be ‘relabelled’ under other shocks in our 
model, such as the sudden stops, but introducing a more primitive shock may give a 
more accurate decomposition. Another factor that relates to the uncertainty is the 
political response to the crisis: domestic consensus on a strategy to exit the crisis was 
lacking in Greece, while it was present to a larger extent in other crisis-hit EZ 
countries such as Ireland and Portugal. 
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Appendix 
 
A  Empirical appendix 
A.1  List of countries 
The list of countries and regions is in Table 6. 
A.2  Definition and list of episodes 
We adopt the following definition of episodes: 
1. Sudden stop: Our sudden stop episodes are constructed by combining an output 
collapse filter and a capital flow reversal filter. To construct the output collapse filter, 
we first identify all cumulated episodes of real GDP decline (Source: annual real GDP 
growth from International Financial Statistics). We define an ‘output collapse’ as in 
Calvo et al. (2006), when the cumulated decline in output exceeds the within group 
median (AE and EME).  
To construct the capital flow filter, we measures the changes in net capital flows as 
follows: (a) year on year change in the (opposite of the) current account relative to 
output, Δ4( –CAt/Yt) as in  Korinek and Mendoza  (2013), where Δk xt = xt – xt-k; (b) 
year-on-year change in the (opposite of the) current account + change in oﬃcial 
reserves, relative to output: Δ4 ((–CAt +ΔRESt)/Yt).  
This measure attempts to measure private capital flows; (c) year-on-year change in 
the cumulated change in the (opposite of the) current account + change in oﬃcial 
reserves, relative to cumulated output, )
~
/)
~~
((4 ttt YSERAC   where 
stst XX 
3
0
~
. (Source: current account, oﬃcial reserves and output in US dollars 
from IFS).  
For each measure of net capital inflows, an episode is triggered when net capital 
inflows fall more than two standard deviations away from the mean (both mean and 
standard deviation are country specific). Consecutive episodes less than 8 quarters 
apart are merged into a single episode.  
Finally, a sudden stop occurs in year t when the trough of the output collapse (output 
collapse filter) overlaps with a sudden stop episode, according to any of the above 
definitions. 
 
 
  
Region Countries 
Latin America (13) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican 
 Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, 
 Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Asia (11) China, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, South 
 Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, 
 Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
Middle East and North Africa (10) Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
 Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates 
Central and Eastern European (15) Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
 Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
 Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
 Slovenia, Turkey 
South Saharan Africa (3) Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, South Africa 
Commonwealth of Independent Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russian 
States (5) Federation, Ukraine 
Advanced Economies (22) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
 Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
 Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New 
 Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
 Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
  
 
Table 6: List of countries. 
 
2. Sovereign Defaults. Sovereign defaults are defined as in Gourinchas and Obstfeld 
(2012), based on the tabulations of Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009); Cantor and Packer 
(1995); Chambers (2011). The year t of a sovereign debt crisis corresponds to the 
year identified with a default on domestic or external debt in these sources.  
  
Country Years Country Years 
               Advanced Economies  
Canada 1982 Denmark 2009 
Germany 2009 Iceland 2010 
Japan 2009 Netherlands 2009 
Spain 2010, 2013 Sweden 1993 
Switzerland 2009 U.K. 1981 
U.S. 2009   
     Emerging Market Economies  
Argentina 1982, 1990, 2002 Bulgaria 2009 
Chile 1983 Colombia 1999 
Cote d’Ivoire 1984 Croatia 2014 
Ecuador 1999 Estonia 2009 
Hong Kong 1998 Hungary 2009 
Indonesia 1998 Korea 1998 
Lithuania 2009 Malaysia 1998 
Mexico 1983, 1995 Philippines 1985 
Romania 1999, 2010 Russia 1998, 2009 
Slovak R. 2009 Slovenia 2009 
Thailand 1998 Turkey 1994, 2001, 2009 
U.A.E 2009 Ukraine 1999, 2009, 2014 
Uruguay 1984   
 
Table 7: List of sudden stop episodes with output collapse. 
  
3. Lending Boom/Bust. We define a lending boom/bust episode as in Gourinchas et 
al. (2001), using the deviation of the ratio of credit to the non-financial sector to 
output from its trend (source: bank credit to the non-financial sector from BIS; and 
depository corporations survey, claims on the private sector, IFS). The trend is an hp 
filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1000. Define cyTt for the trend component of the 
credit to output ratio cyt. A boom occurs whenever cyt > 1.14cy
T
t (boom threshold). 
The boom begins when cyt > 1.05cy
T
t (limit threshold) and ends when that limit 
threshold is crossed again. Episodes less than 2 years apart are combined. The year t 
of the lending boom is the year in which the maximum deviation from trend is 
achieved, within a given episode. 
4. ‘Trifecta’. Trifecta crises are defined as a sovereign debt crisis that occurs during a 
sudden stop and a lending boom episode. These episodes are marked with a ‘*’ in 
Table 8. 
Country Years Country Years 
Argentina 1982, 1989, 2001* Brazil 1983, 1986, 1990, 2002 
Bulgaria 1990 Chile 1983* 
Cote d’Ivoire 1983, 2000 Croatia 1993 
Dominican R. 1982, 2005 Ecuador 1982, 1999*, 2008 
Egypt 1984 El Salvador 1981 
Indonesia 1998*, 2002 Iraq 1990 
Jamaica 2010 Jordan 1989 
Kuwait 1990 Mexico 1982* 
Morocco 1983, 1986 Nigeria 1982, 2001, 2004 
Pakistan 1981, 1999 Panama 1983, 1987 
Peru 1980, 1984 Philippines 1983 
Poland 1981 Romania 1981, 1986 
Russia 1991, 1993, 1998* Serbia 1983, 1992 
South Africa 1985, 1989, 1993 Sri Lanka 1981, 1996 
Turkey 1982, 2001* Ukraine 1998, 2000 
Uruguay 1983*, 1987, 1990, 2003* Venezuela 1982, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2005 
 
Table 8: List of countries. 
  
B. Calibration 
This appendix contains more details on the calibration. Table 11 contains the 
parameters that we choose to match steady state targets for Greece. Table 12 
contains the fiscal rule parameters that we calibrate rather than estimate. 
The following table describes the steady state of the model for reference. We focus 
on a zero inflation steady state, and normalize all price levels to 1, so that there is no 
distinction between variables in euros, or real variables deflated by either the CPI or 
the PPI. We also assume, for simplicity, that NFA = 0 at the steady state, and that 
trade is balanced. 
Country Years Country Years 
 Advanced Economies  
Australia 1980 Canada 1982 
Denmark 2009 Finland 1989 
Greece 1985 Iceland 1982, 2006 
Ireland 1981, 2009 Norway 1988, 2007 
Portugal 1984, 2001, 2009 Spain 1982, 2007 
Sweden 1990   
       Emerging Market Economies  
Argentina 1999, 2013 Belarus 2010 
Bosnia 1997, 2008 Brazil 1995 
Bulgaria 1991, 2008 Chile 1984, 2003 
Colombia 1984, 1997, 2014 Croatia 1998 
Czech R. 1997 Dominican R. 1989, 2003 
Ecuador 1984, 1997 Egypt 1981, 2001 
El Salvador 2000 Estonia 2009 
Georgia 1997, 2008 Hog Kong 1983, 1997 
Hungary 1990, 2009 Indonesia 1998 
Iraq 2004 Israel 2002 
Jamaica 1983, 1989, 2000, 2008 Jordan 2006 
Kazakhstan 1993, 2007 Korea 1998 
Kuwait 1988, 1998, 2009 Latvia 2010 
  
Lebanon 2000 Lithuania 2008 
Macedonia 2008 Malaysia 1997 
Mexico 1981, 1994 Morocco 1981, 1997 
Nigeria 1986, 2009 Oman 1998 
Pakistan 1986, 2008 Panama 1981, 2001 
Peru 1983, 1998 Philippines 1983, 1997, 2014 
Poland 1992, 2009 Romania 1996, 2008 
Russia 1995, 2009 Serbia 2000, 2010 
Slovak R. 1999, 2008 Slovenia 1991, 2009 
South Africa 2008 Sri Lanka 1983, 1995, 2006 
Thailand 1997 Tunisia 1989 
Turkey 1987, 1997 U.A.E 1988, 1998, 2009 
Ukraine 2008 Uruguay 1982, 2002 
Venezuela 2007, 2013   
 
Table 9: List of lending booms. 
 
Parameter Description Value 
β Discount Factor 0.97 
α Capital Share 1/3 
ϵh Elasticity between H and F 1 
ϵf Elasticity between exports 1 
φ Inverse labor supply elasticity 1 
γ Risk Aversion 1 
υ Price Stickiness 0.5 
ε Elasticity of Substitution Goods 6 
υw Wage Stickiness 0.5 
εw Elasticity of Substitution Labor 6 
ϵr Elasticity of R to NFA 0.001 
  
φk Adjustment Cost 1 
δ Depreciation 0.07 
FC Fixed cost of production, 10% of Y 0.0955 
 
Table 10: Standard parameters. 
 
Parameter Description      Value 
   
ϖ Openness(Martin and Philippon (2014)) 0.3 
χ Fraction of Impatient  (Martin and Philippon (2014)) 0.65 
Δ Annual lending spread of 2% 1.02 
Y
B h  Household debt to GDP of 50% 0.5 
Y
B g  Government debt to GDP of 120% 1.2 
Y
G  Government consumption to GDP of 20% 0.2 
Y
T  Public social expenditure to GDP of 20% 0.2 
d
h 
Steady state default rate for Households 5.4% 
d
k 
Steady state default rate for Corporates 5.4% 
Y
B k  Corporate debt to GDP of 50% 0.5 
Ψsk Working Capital Constraint 1 
τ Tax rate, budget balance in SS 0.436 
L Leverage scaling 1 
 
Table 11: Internally calibrated parameters for Greece. 
 
 
 
  
Parameter Description Value 
   
Fb Elasticity of govt. spending to public debt 0.05 
Fn Elasticity of govt. spending to employment 0.025 
Fr Elasticity of govt. spending to the int. rate 0.5 
Fl Persistence of govt. spending 0.75 
 
Table 12: Other parameters. 
 
Variable Description Value 
   
Y Output 0.9548 
C = Cb = Cs Consumption 0.6315 
N Labor 0.7830 
W Wage rate 0.8767 
R = Rg SOE and Sovereign Rates 

1 = 1.0309 
G = T Government Spending and Transfers 0.1910 
K Capital 1.8897 
Q Investment Q 1 
Rk = Rh Corporate Debt and Household Debt Rates 1.1116 
Zk Rental Rate of Capital 0.1816 
Bsk Working Capital Rate 1.02 
Bg Government Debt 1.1457 
Bh Household Debt 0.4774 
 
Table 13: Steady state values. 
This is straightforward to generalize, by appropriately adapting the interest rate 
equation. Finally, we assume that steady state transfers from the government to the 
borrower are such that both agents choose the same amount of labor and 
consumption. 
  
C. Estimation 
Our priors impose that most estimated parameters be in the [0, 1] interval, with the 
exception of some of the elasticities for which we assume Gamma priors. 
Figure 31 plots the priors in orange and the estimated posterior distributions in blue 
for the dynamic parameters, with the posterior mode highlighted in black. Our 
default priors for shock persistence and variances are Beta distributions with mean 
0.85 and variance 0.1, and mean 0.2 and variance 0.1, respectively. The only 
exceptions are the spending and household debt shocks, where we lower the 
persistence and raise the variance due to the presence of an autoregressive term in 
the structural equations for these variables. 
Using the Kalman Smoother at the posterior mode, we can retrieve sequences for the 
structural shocks in the model, which are shown in 32. These are obtained by 
applying the Kalman Smoother for the sequence of observables, with all parameters 
set at their posterior modes. 
   Parameter Description        Prior Prior Mean Prior SD    Post. Mean Post. 90% Interval 
  Shock parameters     
taxp  Persistence of Tax Shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.8441 0.7178 0.9851 
tax  SD of Tax Shock Beta 0.2 0.1 0.0269 0.0118 0.0429 
rp    Persistence of Sudden Stop Shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.6727 0.5452 0.8033 
r  SD of Sudden Stop Shock Beta 0.2 0.1 0.0067 0.0047 0.0089 
spendp  Persistence of Spending Shock Beta 0.25 0.1 0.2785 0.1221 0.4310 
spend  SD of Spending Shock Beta 0.7 0.2 0.0533 0.0359 0.0688 
bhp  Persistence of Credit Shock Beta 0.25 0.1 0.4030 0.2114 0.5860 
bh  SD of Credit Shock Beta 0.7 0.2 0.0955 0.0595 0.1301 
dgp  Persistence of Sov Risk Shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.6442 0.4548 0.8215 
dg  SD of Sov Risk Shock Beta 0.2 0.1 0.2635 0.1463 0.3809 
hp  Persistence of Mark-up Shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.8067 0.6627 0.9522 
h  SD of Mark-up Shock Beta 0.1 0.05 0.0188 0.0085 0.0299 
  
wp  Persistence of Wage Shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.7922 0.6320 0.9632 
w  SD of Wage Shock Beta 0.1 0.05 0.0056 0.0017 0.0097 
defp  Persistence of Default Shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.8701 0.7775 0.9693 
def  SD of Default Shock Beta 0.2 0.1 0.1384 0.0642 0.2157 
 Variance of Measurement Errors 
 error  SD of PPI Meas. Error Beta 0.2 0.1 0.0278 0.0168 0.0376 
w
error  SD of Wage Infl. Meas. Error Beta 0.2 0.1 0.0079 0.0018 0.0142 
def
error  SD of NPL Meas. Error Beta 0.2 0.1 0.0691 0.0138 0.1157 
gd  Impact of 
Y
B g  Beta 0.2 0.1 0.1052 0.0613 0.1456 
  Dynamic Parameters     
yd  Elasticity of default to GDP Gamma 5 1 4.6718 3.4850 5.7238 
bd  Elasticity of default to debt Beta 0.1 0.05 0.1020 0.0222 0.1751 
Ψ
bh 
Adjustment Speed of b
h
 Beta 0.85 0.1 0.9536 0.9118 0.9926 
bh  Elasticity of credit to funding cost Gamma 2 1 1.7388 0.4233 2.9881 
d  Impact of default on funding cost Beta 0.001 0.0005 0.0009 0.0003 0.0015 
 
Table 14: Priors and Posteriors. Note: The table present Bayesian estimates of model parameters. It specifies 
the distribution for the prior, its mean, standard deviation, as well as the posterior mean, and 90% 
confidence interval. 
D. Impulse responses 
Figure 33 shows the impulse response to a private default shock, 
def
t . The surge in 
private defaults increases the private sector funding cost and reduces the spending of 
impatient households who are at their borrowing constraint. This adversely aﬀects 
investment, output and employment. As the economy enters a recession, sovereign 
yields increase. Government expenditures are the result of two oﬀsetting forces: the 
recession increases spending (automatic stabilizers), but the increase in public debt 
triggers some automatic consolidation. The net eﬀect is a mild decline in spending. 
  
Net exports improve as both competitiveness increases (lower domestic inflation), 
and domestic absorption declines. 
 
Figure 31: Priors, Posteriors and Mode for the dynamic parameters. Note: The blue line is the posterior 
density, the orange line is the prior density and the black dashed line is the posterior mode. 
                            
Figure 32: Smoothed shocks. 
  
Figure 34 shows the response of the economy to credit demand shock, 
bh
t . 
Impatient households borrow to finance consumption. This initially stimulates output 
and employment, and inflation, but crowds out investment as credit risk increases 
and therefore private funding costs leading to a subsequent output decline. The 
increase in absorption exceeds output, so the trade balance deteriorates. 
 
Figure 33: Private default shock. 
 
Figure 34: Household demand credit shock. 
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